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Student: “Piracy? To deny access simply 
because of resources, that’s ridiculous in this 
day and age. So, kudos to the author for his 
textbook, but I need a degree. Sorry!”1 
Another student: “Fears about illegal 
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Professor, Faculty of Law, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa; 
Affiliated Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, 
Munich, Germany. This Article is based on research supported in part by the National 
Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant Number: 111697). 
1 Eve Gray & Laura Czerniewicz, Access to Learning Resources in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa, in SHADOW LIBRARIES: ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN GLOBAL HIGHER EDUCATION 
107, 141–42 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2018) (citing examples of South African higher 
education students’ non-responsiveness to anti-piracy rhetoric in the context of 
educational materials; student statement slightly adapted here). 
2 Id. at 142 (student statement slightly adapted here). 





Printed textbooks remain crucial for education, particularly in 
developing countries. However, in many of these countries, textbooks are 
unavailable, too expensive, or not accessible in learners’ native tongues. 
Digital content, for many reasons, does not prove a wondrous solution. 
Cheaply (translating and) reproducing textbooks would be a strategy. 
However, reprography is highly regulated under copyright law. Copyright 
also adds to the cost of textbooks. The availability, accessibility, and 
acceptability of learning materials constitute essential elements of the 
right to education under international human rights law. Intellectual 
property (IP) law has so far refrained from endorsing the concept of 
extraterritorial state obligations (ETOs) under international human rights 
law (IHRL), that is, of states, in appropriate circumstances, bearing 
human rights obligations toward those living beyond their own territory. 
This reluctance is regrettable if it is borne in mind that most IP, including 
copyright law originates at the international level, where each state plays 
a role in designing rules that may affect the lives of those in other 
countries. ETOs could assume a key function in “civilizing”—as it were, 
“constitutionalizing”—IP law. This Article will demonstrate the 
significance of ETOs for IP law by focusing on the issue of how the right 
to education under IHRL prescribes requirements that international 
copyright law must comply with to facilitate access to textbooks in 
schools and universities. Drawing on the expert Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights of 2011, and applying the well-known tripartite typology 
of state obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights, the ETOs 
concept will be introduced and twenty typical ETOs under the right to 
education in the international copyright context that safeguard access to 
printed textbooks will be identified. A final central aim of the Article will 
be to explain how exactly, within international law as a unified system, 
ETOs can lead to a “constitutionalization” of IP law. Although the 
discussion relates to issues of accessibility in developing countries more 
generally, the dire situation of access to textbooks in education in Africa 
strongly motivated this research. 
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I.   COPYRIGHT LAW AND ACCESS TO TEXTBOOKS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Printed textbooks are crucial for education, particularly in developing 
countries. Hard-copy materials remain important in schools and 
universities.3 Not denying the educational value of digital texts, research 
shows that in-depth understanding still requires browsing through and 
marking sections in printed texts.4 Furthermore, in developing countries, 
information and communication technology often is not available or 
accessible: “[L]evels of both computer ownership (and computer use or 
access) and Internet access . . . are far below those found in rich, 
industrialised countries.”5 Hence, only one in five people in Sub-Saharan 
Africa used the internet in 2017.6 Constraints result from lack of 
electricity, computer illiteracy, high costs of internet services, and the 
difficulty of provision in rural areas.7 Other problems of accessibility 
relate to the fact that, generally, open access is not a common feature, 
peer-to-peer platforms are not quite legal, access is restricted by 
technological protection measures (TPMs) which summarily negate 
permissible copyright limitations and exceptions, and the circumvention 
of TPMs is often a crime. Altogether, therefore, digital content does not 
prove to be a wondrous solution, wherefore the textbook remains 
important. It remains “extremely important” in the countries of the global 
South.8 
However, “[t]extbooks are a rare commodity in most developing 
countries. One book per student (in any subject) is the exception, not the 
rule, and the rule in most classrooms is, unfortunately, severe scarcity or 
 
3 See SUSAN ISIKO ŠTRBA, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND ACCESS TO EDUCATION 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: EXPLORING MULTILATERAL LEGAL AND QUASI-LEGAL 
SOLUTIONS 202 (2012) (“[D]eveloping countries depend primarily on printed copies of 
copyrighted works, as opposed to electronic works, for educational purposes. Therefore, 
the textbook represents the most important source of information.”); Caroline B. Ncube, 
Using Human Rights to Move Beyond Reformism to Radicalism: A2K for Schools, 
Libraries and Archives, in Critical Guide to Intellectual Property 117, 129 (Mat Callahan 
& Jim Rogers eds., 2017) (“In the Global South . . . bulk hard copies [of learning 
materials] are required.”). 
4 The Evolution of Reading in the Age of Digitisation (E-READ) research network, an 
Action of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology, the latter funded by the 
European Union, in its Stavanger Declaration concerning the Future of Reading of 
January 2019, thus refers to its research findings showing that, when compared to 
reading in print, “reading digitally . . . in particular when under time pressure, lead[s] to 
more skimming and less concentration on reading matter.” It is also stated that “[a] meta-
study of 54 studies with more than 170.000 participants demonstrates that 
comprehension of long-form informational text is stronger when reading on paper than 
on screens, particularly when the reader is under time pressure.” E-READ COST, 
Stavanger Declaration concerning the Future of Reading, https://ereadcost.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/StavangerDeclaration.pdf. 
5 Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must 
Be Repealed, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 763, 797 (2003). 
6 See Daniel Gerszon Mahler, Jose Montes & David Newhouse, Internet Access in Sub-
Saharan Africa, No. 13 Poverty & Equity Notes 1 (World Bank, Mar. 2019) (relying here 
on data of the International Telecommunications Union). 
7 Id. at 4. 
8 Story, supra note 5, at 797. 
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the total absence of textbooks.”9 Where textbooks are available in 
developing countries, they are often very expensive, and, accordingly, 
unaffordable. A newspaper article of 2014 thus reported for South African 
university students the high cost of textbooks meant that many students 
could not buy all the books they needed for their studies.10 Some 
textbooks may be available, but not in the relevant local languages in 
which they are needed. As for Africa, UNESCO notes for reading books 
in children’s languages a scarcity in all African languages and the virtual 
absence of books in many key languages.11 All this is problematic, of 
course, where access to textbooks is held covered by the human right to 
education. 
The lack of access to textbooks in developing countries has many 
reasons. There is a lack of reliable data on student enrollments; teaching 
and learning material systems are poorly managed due to a lack of trained 
manpower or good communication facilities; in upper secondary and 
higher education there is a continued dependence on expensive imported 
textbooks; financing is “inadequate, irregular, and unpredictable”;12 and 
distribution and school storage systems are dysfunctional.13 Moreover, 
textbook procurement is uncompetitive and bribery by suppliers not 
uncommon.14 However, copyright must also be considered a reason 
inhibiting access to textbooks.15 
 
9 PERNILLE ASKERUD, A GUIDE TO SUSTAINABLE BOOK PROVISION 16 (UNESCO, 1997). 
This remains true today. For Sub-Saharan Africa, see, e.g., UNESCO, GLOBAL 
EDUCATION MONITORING REPORT 2016, EDUCATION FOR PEOPLE AND PLANET: 
CREATING SUSTAINABLE FUTURES FOR ALL 190 (UNESCO, 2016), 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000245752_eng (“In some sub-Saharan 
African countries, few primary school students have personal copies of textbooks.”) 
[hereinafter UNESCO, GLOBAL EDUCATION MONITORING REPORT 2016]; INT’L 
COMM’N ON FIN. GLOB. EDUC. OPPORTUNITY, THE LEARNING GENERATION: INVESTING 
IN EDUCATION FOR A CHANGING WORLD 66 (2016), 
https://report.educationcommission.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Learning_Generation_Full_Report.pdf (“[I]n many [Sub-
Saharan African] countries, textbooks are underfunded, priced too high, unavailable to 
many students, or poorly used.”). 
10 Bongani Nkosi, Students Hurt by Pricey Textbooks, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2014), 
https://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-03-students-hurt-by-pricey-textbooks. 
11 UNESCO, GLOBAL EDUCATION MONITORING REPORT 2016, supra note 9, at 190 
(referring to an inventory of reading materials from eleven Sub-Saharan African 
countries). 
12 TONY READ, WHERE HAVE ALL THE TEXTBOOKS GONE? TOWARD SUSTAINABLE 
PROVISION OF TEACHING AND LEARNING MATERIALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 13 
(World Bank, 2015). 
13 See id. (mentioning these and other reasons for the Sub-Saharan African context). 
14 INT’L COMM’N ON FIN. GLOB. EDUC. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 9, at 66–67. 
15 Various publications have addressed the conflict between copyright and access, or the 
right, to education in the past. In lieu of many sources, see, e.g., SARA BANNERMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 53–79 (2016); Margaret 
Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for Education, 40 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 803 (2007); GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 282–98 (2008); Sharon E. Foster, The Conflict between 
the Human Right to Education and Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND 
 




Where textbooks are unavailable, too expensive, or not available in 
relevant local languages, their cheap (translation and) reproduction by 
governments, educational institutions, or libraries would be a solution. 
However, “[r]eprography, which, from a developmental perspective, 
could facilitate access is often seen from the perspective of ‘piracy’ and 
is highly regulated.”16 Copyright also affects the price at which textbooks 
can be provided.17 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires World Trade Organization 
members to put in place a system of copyright protection in accordance 
with most of the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works of 1971.18 Under the Berne Convention, the 
reproduction and translation of literary and artistic works are the exclusive 
rights of the copyright holder.19 Anyone else seeking to reproduce or 
translate such works, or larger portions thereof, requires the copyright 
holder’s consent. Copyright holders might not be traceable or refuse 
consent. Where they grant consent, they usually require the payment of a 
licensing fee. Especially in the developmental context, these factors tend 
to impede access to textbooks. The exact extent of copyright as an 
impeding factor in relation to other impeding factors is difficult to assess. 
Yet, one must agree with Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin, where they 
state that, “[e]ven so, analysis . . . must also take account of situations in 
which intellectual property law may make a real difference to the 
provision of learning materials, and, in turn, the realization of the human 
right to education.”20 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS 333 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 3d ed. 2015); LAURENCE R. HELFER & 
GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE 
GLOBAL INTERFACE 316–63 (2011); ROBIN RAMCHARAN, INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN SECURITY 65–71 (2013); Melissa 
Staudinger, A Textbook Version of the Doha Declaration: Editing the TRIPS Agreement 
to Establish Worldwide Education and Global Competition, 55 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 319 (2015); Alan Story, Don’t Ignore Copyright, the “Sleeping Giant” on the 
TRIPS and International Educational Agenda, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 125 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne 
eds., 2002). 
16 RAMCHARAN, supra note 15, at 65. 
17 HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 318. 
18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Part II, Section 1 
(Copyright and Related Rights), Art. 9(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
19 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Arts. 8, 9(1), 
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 15, 
1972), and amended Sept. 28, 1979 (Article 8 provides for the author’s exclusive right 
of translation, and Article 9(1) for the author’s exclusive right of reproduction) 
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
20 HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 357. See also Story, supra note 5, at 799 
(“[C]opyright problems take a clear second or third place as an access hurdle. 
Nevertheless, copyright definitely creates a further barrier to access.”). Specifically in 
addressing higher education, see COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS. (CIPR), INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 103 (Sept. 2002 Report 
of the U.K. CIPR, 3d ed. 2003) (“[C]opyright is not the only issue . . . but high prices of 
books and materials . . . are still important parts of a worsening crisis.”) [hereinafter 
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report]. 
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International copyright law does make provision for certain 
limitations and exceptions to copyright protection to safeguard the public 
interest in access to works that enjoy copyright protection, also for 
educational purposes. However, as the discussion will show, limitations 
and exceptions relevant to education hardly countenance the bulk 
provision of learning materials, this, as it were, being what is needed in 
developing countries. Moreover, the compulsory licensing scheme under 
the Appendix to the Berne Convention, conceived to serve bulk provision 
for educational purposes in developing countries, has proven ineffective 
in practice. 
II.   CONSTITUTIONALIZING IP LAW THROUGH EXTRATERRITORIAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
More than twenty years ago, Philip Altbach remarked that 
[t]he time has come to recognize that the production of books 
and journals is more than a business, and that trade in 
knowledge and knowledge products is somehow different than 
commerce in automobiles or coconuts. Those who control 
knowledge distribution have a responsibility to ensure that 
knowledge is available throughout the world at a price that can 
be afforded by the Third World.21 
 
However, whose responsibility is referred to here? Who controls 
knowledge distribution? Would this be the big publishing firms operating 
from countries of the Global North, individual, especially developed 
states, intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) or the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) as such, states as members of such organizations, especially those 
influential in the formulation of copyright policy by such organizations—
or more or all of these? As has been pointed out, and as will further be 
explained below, access to textbooks forms part of the human right to 
education. However, where, due to strict copyright laws imposed by a 
developing state, access to textbooks in that state is obstructed—and the 
right to education in that state therefore at peril—it does not really make 
sense to brand that state a human rights violator where the ultimate reason 
for the violation has a different, global, international source. The 
application of mere territorial human rights paradigms clearly does not 
suffice in a globalized world characterized by a harsh North-South divide. 
The present context is one where TRIPS norms are increasingly 
considered minimum standards inviting expansive interpretations of 
copyright and other IP rights. Bilateral and plurilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) oblige developing states to provide for enhanced 
levels of IP rights protection, extending beyond TRIPS. WIPO pursues an 
unabated agenda of “harmonizing” global IP law. Developed states urge 
those states yet to attain more advanced stages of socio-economic 
 
21 Philip G. Altbach, The Subtle Inequalities of Copyright, 8(15) THE ACQUISITIONS 
LIBRARIAN 17, 26 (1996) (emphasis added). 




development to slavishly replicate the developed states’ intricate IP 
systems. In this context, access to textbooks—in the same way as 
technological development, food security, access to essential medicines, 
participation in cultural life, or sustainable traditional community life, as 
goods similarly threatened by IP rights—will remain a distant dream in 
the developing world unless a novel approach to obligations and 
accountability is adopted. All those wielding power in the design and 
implementation of global copyright and other IP law should no longer 
remain beyond the reach of human rights just because their conduct does 
not harm those within their own physical (or conceptual) territory. Actors 
whose conduct may have a detrimental effect on the enjoyment of the 
human rights of those beyond such territory must, in certain 
circumstances at least, be considered to bear human rights obligations 
with regard to those people far away. 
Remaining in the realm of international political misdemeanor falls 
short of what is needed today. Applying the normativity of international 
human rights to state conduct (also) in as far as such conduct may have 
extraterritorial repercussions has at least two distinct benefits: On the one 
hand, as has so aptly been stated by Katarina Tomaševski, at the time the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, “[t]he difference 
which human rights bring can be expressed in one single word—violation. 
The mobilizing power of calling a betrayed pledge a human rights 
violation is immense.”22 Certainly, no state wants to be labeled a violator 
of human rights. On the other hand, there is the benefit that a violations 
approach, once human rights have been legally defined at the international 
level, implicates the actual legal accountability of states toward the 
world’s most vulnerable. Hence, whereas the violations approach had 
originally only been adopted with regard to the protection of civil and 
political rights within a state’s territory, it was, during the 1990s and 
2000s, in a first wave of extension, also made to apply with regard to the 
protection of economic, social, and cultural rights within a state’s 
territory.23 That approach now, in a second wave of extension, needs to 
be made applicable to all human rights in their extraterritorial application. 
While it has been held that business enterprises should “respect 
internationally recognized human rights, wherever they operate”24 and 
 
22 KATARINA TOMAŠEVSKI, REMOVING OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF THE RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION 10 (2001). 
23 This culminated in the adoption, in 2008, of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which allows individuals and groups 
of individuals, and also states in certain cases, to bring claims of violations of economic, 
social, and cultural rights before the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Arts. 2, 10, Dec. 10, 2008, 2922 U.N.T.S. 27 (entered into force May 5, 
2013) (individual and group, and inter-state communications, respectively). The U.N. 
Human Rights Committee has had effective competence to receive claims alleging 
violations of rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights since 
1976 already. Both Covenants were adopted at the same time though, in 1966. 
24 John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
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that international organizations have human rights obligations “under, 
inter alia, general international law and international agreements to which 
they are parties,”25 the discussion here will focus on “extraterritorial state 
obligations” under international human rights law (IHRL) (in this sense, 
abbreviated ETOs here). IP law has so far refrained from endorsing the 
ETOs concept, the notion that states, in appropriate circumstances, hold 
human rights obligations toward those living beyond their own territory. 
Amongst others, international assistance and co-operation obligations 
would be implicated in this regard. This reluctance is regrettable if it is 
borne in mind that most IP, including copyright law originates at the 
international level. This is the level of state interaction, where each state, 
through the role it chooses to play in shaping and enforcing international 
IP law and policy, can advance or obstruct human rights in other states. It 
is in this context, therefore, that ETOs, also those arising under the right 
to education, could assume a key function in “civilizing”—that is, 
“constitutionalizing”—IP law. 
The purpose of the discussion that follows is to demonstrate the 
significance of ETOs for IP law by recourse to the right to education as 
an example. The question is, in what way does the latter right, as protected 
by IHRL, by virtue of its extraterritorial application, prescribe 
requirements that international copyright law must comply with to 
facilitate access to textbooks in schools and universities. Section VI will 
provide an introduction to the ETOs concept. Section VII will then attempt 
to identify typical ETOs under the right to education in the Berne, TRIPS, 
and FTA context that safeguard access to textbooks.26 The provisions of 
 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Annex, Guiding Principle 23(a), U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
25 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE 
AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, Principle 16 (2011). On the 
Maastricht Principles, see infra note 167. Both WIPO and the WTO as such would thus 
be required to obey human rights obligations that are binding on them under customary 
international law or that form part of the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations. Moreover, while the WTO is not a U.N. specialized agency, WIPO is. As such, 
it has an obligation to obey the goals of the United Nations, one of these being respect 
for human rights, this goal being laid down in Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter. U.N. 
Charter Art. 1(3). 
26 For a discussion of the topic of ETOs in relation to international IP law, specifically 
TRIPS, see Klaus D. Beiter, Establishing Conformity between TRIPS and Human Rights: 
Hierarchy in International Law, Human Rights Obligations of the WTO and 
Extraterritorial State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 
445 (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter Beiter, Conformity between TRIPS and 
Human Rights]. This is the first, and it seems only, explicit discussion so far of this topic. 
There is an interesting book chapter by Ruth L. Okediji addressing the responsibility of 
the WTO, that of host and home states of corporations for these corporations’ conduct, 
and that of corporations themselves. The source of obligations is, however, it seems, seen 
essentially in the goals and objectives of TRIPS itself. Ruth L. Okediji, Securing 
Intellectual Property Objectives: New Approaches to Human Rights Considerations, in 
CASTING THE NET WIDER: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND NEW DUTY-BEARERS 
211 (Margot E. Salomon, Arne Tostensen & Wouter Vandenhole eds., 2007). For a wider 
 




the expert Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States 
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 2011 and the 
familiar classification of states’ human rights obligations as obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights will help structure this part of the 
discussion. This exercise can, and should, be repeated for other fields of 
IP law in potential conflict with IHRL as well. Section VIII rounds off the 
analysis, concretizing the notion of “civilizing” IP, specifically copyright 
law. It is concretized by relying on the concept of the 
“constitutionalization” of IP law “from below.” This concept suggests that 
states are to take ETOs seriously as a matter of consistent practice—not 
least when creating, and defining the powers of, international courts and 
tribunals. The concept emphasizes recognition of de facto hierarchies in 
international law (many of which are human rights-associated) and 
respect for those obligations of general international law, which, as “rules 
of legitimacy,” cannot be “contracted out” of (likewise often linked to 
human rights), in the creation or application, and the decentralized 
enforcement of international law. The next two sections, Sections III and 
IV, will, however, first outline the constraints of current copyright law in 
facilitating access to textbooks. Section V will explain in what ways 
access to textbooks should be held covered by the right to education as 
protected by IHRL. 
The discussion relates to issues of accessibility in developing 
countries generally, but, in particular, the critical lack of access to 
textbooks in education in Africa motivated this research. The term 
“textbook” as used in the Article may mean typical textbooks designed 
for instructional use in schools and universities (or larger portions of such 
textbooks), all other books that may have an educational purpose (or 
larger portions of such books), or both. In the present context, the 
reference is not so much to scholarly literature for pure research purposes. 
The reference is further to printed textbooks. The term “learning 
materials,” by contrast, would be wider, including notably digital content 
too.27 
III.   CONSTRAINTS OF CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW: LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS 
Copyright is to serve as an incentive for the creation of knowledge or 
culture. Recourse to such knowledge or culture by others occurs against a 
reward being paid to the author. In accordance with the orthodox 
underpinnings of copyright law, the fact that the skill, labor, and judgment 
extended in producing new works is rewarded, is considered as crucial in 
leading to the production of literary, artistic, and other creative works that 
 
analysis of ETOs arising under the right to education, see Klaus D. Beiter, Is the Age of 
Human Rights Really Over? The Right to Education in Africa: Domesticization, Human 
Rights-Based Development, and Extraterritorial State Obligations, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
9, 48–87 (2017). 
27 See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 318–19 (discussing differences between the 
two terms). 
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will enhance learning in society.28 However, the mere availability of such 
works does not, of course, mean that everyone will also have access to 
these. There will be those unable to pay the reward. There will further be 
instances in which types of use of a work do not justify the lengthy process 
of obtaining author consent and/or the payment of any, or “the full,” 
reward. International copyright law provides for certain limitations and 
exceptions (L&Es) to copyright protection to safeguard the public interest 
in access to works that enjoy copyright protection, also for educational 
purposes. L&Es may allow use without the author’s consent, but against 
(a potentially reduced) payment, or they may entail use without consent 
and without a reward. Remuneration becomes relevant where, and to the 
extent that, without this, the copyright holder’s right of economic 
exploitation would be unreasonably prejudiced.29 Far-reaching 
entitlements to use that would usually only be available under contractual 
terms may further be awarded under a “compulsory license.” This is a 
very special type of L&E. As understood here, “compulsory licenses” are 
granted by a designated national agency in exceptional cases of urgency, 
or in certain other cases, where this is justifiable in the public interest. 
They must be specifically applied for and (typically) entail an obligation 
to pay fair remuneration.30 
Articles 9 and 10 of the Berne Convention, for example, contain 
L&Es relevant in this context. Article 9(2) allows the reproduction of 
literary or artistic works in circumscribed circumstances.31 On the basis 
of Article 9(2), states parties could enact provisions that would permit 
students to make limited copies from textbooks (available in the library 
of an educational institution, for example) for purposes of personal or 
private use, research, or study. It may well be asked whether this could 
also cover students using such copies from typical or any other textbooks 
in class. If this is not private, it may yet be personal use. 
Article 10(1) permits quotations from a literary or artistic work. 
 
28 This is a standard assumption of IP law. “[M]odern economic arguments . . . assume 
that the motivation towards creativity will be strengthened through the use of property 
rights in abstract objects and weakened by their absence.” PETER DRAHOS, A 
PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 27 (1996). Specifically as regards copyright 
law, however, empirical evidence does not conclusively prove this point. Christopher J. 
Sprigman, Copyright and Creative Incentives: What Do(n’t) We Know?, in FRAMING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INTEGRATING INCENTIVES, 
TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & 
Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng eds., 2018). 
29 On “remuneration-based L&Es,” see specifically infra Section VII(B)(8). 
“Remuneration-based L&Es” are sometimes also termed “statutory licenses,” with 
(ordinarily) statutory law granting “automatic” authorization to use a work against 
remuneration in these cases. 
30 On “compulsory licenses,” see the discussion infra of the Appendix to the Berne 
Convention in Section IV and further the aspects raised infra in Section VII(B)(6) and 
VII(D)(16). 
31 Berne Convention, supra note 19, Art. 9(2). See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying 
text for a description of the three-step test of copyright law, as embodying these 
circumscribed circumstances. 




Obviously, a quotation signifies a limited portion of a work.32 Of 
significance for education is the teaching L&E in Article 10(2). This 
permits the utilization of literary or artistic works “by way of illustration” 
in, for example, publications “for teaching.” Such use may take place “to 
the extent justified by the purpose” and must be “compatible with fair 
practice.”33 Use “by way of illustration” indicates that passages of a work 
or an entire small work may be used.34 “Teaching” means non-
commercial teaching in educational institutions from the elementary up to 
the advanced level.35 Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg note the 
restrictive nature of the accepted interpretation, as it excludes adult 
education courses not offered by the formal educational institutions of a 
country and also adult literacy campaigns.36 “Teaching” could further be 
interpreted not to include distance education as this does not take place 
within the physical location of an educational institution.37 Beyond the 
requirement of “fair practice,” Article 10(2) does not impose any 
restriction on the number of copies that may be made.38 “Fair practice” 
would however entail that, where large numbers of copies are made for 
individual classroom use by students, the amount copied will be “a highly 
relevant factor.”39 
Martin Senftleben maintains that Article 10(2) permits the use of all 
works, except those “intended for the use in schools, like a schoolbook,” 
as, in this instance, “the utilisation for teaching constitutes a major source 
of royalty revenue.”40 Daniel Gervais proposes a similar, but more 
stratified approach. Utilization does not extend to “material created for 
 
32 The making of quotations must be “compatible with fair practice” and “their extent 
[must] not exceed that justified by the purpose.” Berne Convention, supra note 19, 
Art. 10(1). The source and the name of the author are to be mentioned. Id. Art. 10(3). 
33 Hence, to cite the provision as a whole: states parties may “permit the utilization, to 
the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in 
publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such 
utilization is compatible with fair practice.” Id. Art. 10(2). Again, the source and the 
name of the author are to be mentioned. Id. Art. 10(3). 
34 MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW 234 
(2004). See also SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶ 13.45 (2d ed. 2006) 
(stating that the words “by way of illustration” “would not exclude the use of the whole 
of a work in appropriate circumstances,” mentioning the example of a short literary 
work, such as a poem or short story). 
35 DANIEL J. GERVAIS, (RE)STRUCTURING COPYRIGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE PATH TO 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 93 (2017); RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra 
note 34, ¶ 13.45. 
36 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 34, ¶ 13.45. 
37 See Story, supra note 5, at 798 (pointing out that this problematic interpretation is 
variously chosen). See also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 34, ¶ 13.45 (arguing 
that there is “no reason” to exclude distance education). 
38 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 34, ¶ 13.45. 
39 Id. 
40 SENFTLEBEN, supra note 34, at 198. In effect, his argument is that the use of primary 
instructional materials would conflict with “a normal exploitation of the work” and 
would thus not comply with the second leg of the three-step test of copyright law. Id. at 
197–98. He further holds that all permitted uses covered by Article 10(2) should be 
modestly remunerated. Id. at 234, 240. 
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education.”41 When material is not created for education but “education 
is a significant market,” in that material is occasionally used by schools, 
“small-scale, spontaneous use” is permissible.42 When education is not a 
significant market (for example, publicly-available online resources), 
more generous spontaneous use is permissible.43 
Article 9(2) permits the limited reproduction of works. The provision, 
as drafted in the wake of the 1967 revision of Berne, sets out the famous 
three-step test of copyright law. States parties may accordingly enact 
national L&Es that permit the reproduction of works. Such permission 
may only apply: 
1. “in certain special cases,” 
2. if reproduction “does not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work,” and 
3. if it “does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author.”44 
 
L&Es under Article 10 are leges speciales. Yet, their inclusion of a 
test of proportionality and a reference to “fair practice” suggest a close 
link to reasoning under the three-step test, which requires a balance 
between the interests of right holders, those of users, and those of the 
wider public to be established.45 In any event, Article 13 of TRIPS now 
makes the three-step test applicable to L&Es in copyright law more 
generally. While the three-step test could be read constructively and 
dynamically as “a clause not merely limiting limitations, but empowering 
contracting States to enact them, subject to the proportionality test that 
forms its core and that fully takes into account, inter alia, fundamental 
rights and freedoms and the general public interest,” the reality is that it 
is widely read restrictively as “imposing limits on the ‘erosion’ of 
copyright.”46 The WTO itself, for example, does not construe the test 
holistically with an emphasis on the third leg, which stresses compromise 
between diverse interests, but initially focuses on its first leg, interpreting 
this very literally as requiring L&Es to be “narrow in quantitative as well 
as a qualitative sense.”47 Contesting such disempowering readings of the 
test, a group of respected copyright law experts, in a formal statement of 
2008, held that “certain interpretations of the Three-Step Test at 
international level [are] undesirable,” and that “national courts and 
 
41 GERVAIS, supra note 35, at 227–28. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Berne Convention, supra note 19, Art. 9(2). 
45 See GERVAIS, supra note 35, at 93 (“To determine fairness [under Article 10(2)], a 
WTO panel would likely apply a rule of reason compatible with the three-step test.”); 
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 34, ¶ 13.45 (Article 10(2) “would require 
consideration of the criteria referred to in article 9(2).”). 
46 P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an International Instrument on 
Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright: Final Report 25 (Institute for Information 
Law, University of Amsterdam & University of Minnesota Law School, Mar. 6, 2008), 
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/limitations_exceptions_copyright.pdf. 
47 Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, ¶ 6.109, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000). 




legislatures have been wrongly influenced by restrictive interpretations of 
that Test.”48 
In the developing world, it is also problematic that L&Es under 
international copyright law are not compulsory. This renders many a 
developing country vulnerable to accepting the deceptive promises by 
developed states of funds for “capacity building” to help set up copyright 
structures in return for not making use of the L&Es and not undertaking 
copyright law reforms that would adequately address issues of access.49 
In the extreme, developed states might communicate outright threats of 
retaliation.50 Moreover, the flexibility of international L&Es means that 
they must be concretized at the national level. This is a daunting exercise 
for countries that lack the institutional capacity to do so.51 Further, and 
fundamentally, even a benevolent construction of the above L&Es in 
terms of conventional copyright law wisdom will not solve problems of 
legitimate access as such for the masses. Ruth Okediji explains it as 
follows: 
Limitations and exceptions to IP rights certainly can address 
specific challenges, but rarely are they sufficient to meet the 
development-related challenges—such as bulk access to 
educational works—facing many least-developed and developing 
countries. . . . Existing limitations and exceptions available in 
international copyright law, and in many domestic copyright laws, 
do not extend to institutional, community or group needs.52 
 
The L&Es would permit spontaneous, occasional use.53 The L&Es 
would not, however, permit educational institutions photocopying 
(substantial portions of) a textbook and making that available for free or 
cheaply to students, or including it in a course pack. In more developed 
states, it is customary for educational institutions to conclude use 
agreements with collecting societies that regulate utilization under the 
L&Es, and beyond these, against remuneration. However, even these 
agreements would usually not provide for bulk access. Quite apart from 
that, educational institutions in developing countries frequently lack the 
necessary capacity and resources to conclude such agreements.54 In 
 
48 Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law, 
Preamble, as presented in Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths, Reto M. Hilty et al., 
Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law, 39 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 711 (2008) [hereinafter Geiger et al., 
Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law]. 
49 Ruth L. Okediji, Reframing International Copyright Limitations and Exceptions as 
Development Policy, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 
429, 481 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017). 
50 Id. at 480–81. 
51 Id. at 480. 
52 See Ruth L. Okediji, Does Intellectual Property Need Human Rights?, 51 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1, 34 (2018). 
53 GERVAIS, supra note 35, at 93. 
54 See Chon, supra note 15, at 831 (referring to the questionable capacity of educational 
institutions in the developing world to participate in the exchange of royalty fees with 
reproduction rights organizations). 
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general, the collecting society model appears ill-suited for developing 
countries in the short to medium term.55 Collecting societies are expensive 
and bureaucratic, have a propensity to wield significant market power, 
and in developing countries happen to collect far more royalties for IP 
right holders from rich countries than for local creators.56 
Beyond permissions to translate that may be covered under the above 
L&Es, the Berne/TRIPS system does not provide for special L&Es for 
translation. It is true that there are certain special provisions that would 
allow the translation of books. However, these are either irrelevant 
today—to wit, the clause on the so-called “ten-year regime”—or have 
proven unworkable in practice—thus, the provisions of the Appendix to 
the Berne Convention. The latter, envisioning a compulsory licensing 
scheme for developing countries, merit separate discussion under the 
following heading.57 As far as the ten-year regime is concerned, 
Article 30(2) of the Berne Convention of 1971 allows states, in defined 
circumstances, on ratification or accession—and only at that time—by 
express declaration, to secure the application of the provisions of Article 5 
of the Union Convention of 1886, as completed at Paris in 1896.58 This 
had provided for the expiry of an author’s translation rights with regard 
to a specific language, if, ten years after the first publication of the original 
work, no translation into that language had been effected by the author or 
with his or her authorization. While the ten-year regime, in principle, 
could have facilitated large-scale access to works for educational 
purposes,59 it has become irrelevant today as it could only be made 
applicable, in certain instances, on ratification or accession. Another 
complication is that developing countries that have chosen to apply the 
ten-year regime cannot then also rely on the translation provisions of the 
Berne Appendix, and vice versa.60 Any election in favor of the one rather 
than the other, cannot, moreover, be reversed later.61 It may also be noted 
that ten years is a very long time for works of the natural and physical 
sciences and of technology, where knowledge becomes outdated very 
quickly.62 
The absence of L&Es for translation is highly problematic. The 
former U.N. Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Farida 
Shaheed, points out that whereas speakers of the world’s major languages 
may choose from among “millions of books,” speakers of local languages 
 
55 See COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 20, at 99 (holding, or 
appearing to hold, this view). 
56 Id. at 98–99. 
57 See infra Section IV. 
58 Berne Convention, supra note 19, Art. 30(2). 
59 See Alberto J. Cerda Silva, Beyond the Unrealistic Solution for Development Provided 
by the Appendix of the Berne Convention on Copyright, 60 J. COPY. SOC’Y U.S.A. 581, 
585 (2013) (The scheme “may facilitate meeting the needs of developing countries 
because it enables the massive use of works for educational purposes.”). 
60 Berne Convention, supra note 19, app. at Art. V(1)(a). 
61 Id. app. at Art. V(1)(c), (2). 
62 See Silva, supra note 59, at 585–86 (discussing the various shortcomings of the 
arrangements). Generally for a comprehensive understanding of the ten-year regime, see 
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 34, ¶¶ 11.15–11.18, 11.25, 17.27(f)(ii). 




have access to “very few.”63 It is not only the limited size of the linguistic 
communities to which local language speakers belong, but more 
significantly the overall socio-economic situation of these communities, 
regularly characterized by general structural disadvantagement, that has 
the effect that there usually does not exist a major publishing market for 
the languages spoken.64 This is certainly true for the African context, 
where, in the production of materials, local languages are ignored in favor 
of English, French, or Portuguese.65 The absence of L&Es for translation 
is problematic from a non-discrimination perspective, as it 
disproportionately affects those not speaking a globally used language.66 
However, it also poses a substantial barrier to the right to take part in 
cultural life67 and further disregards the needs of linguistic groups for 
whom the ability to translate works into their own languages is essential 
for education.68 
In the same way that there is no single, broad international education 
L&E, none exists for libraries (including those of schools or universities). 
A 2017 WIPO study recognizes that L&Es for libraries “are fundamental 
to the structure of copyright law”69 and “serve public interests by 
permitting libraries to make socially beneficial uses of copyrighted 
works.”70 Countries currently provide for L&Es that allow libraries to 
make copies of mostly shorter works for individual readers or researchers 
on request, or that permit reproduction for preservation or replacement 
purposes.71 However, yet again, what is needed, at any rate in 
developmental contexts, is an L&E for libraries (and, generally, all kinds 
of cultural institutions and literacy-enhancing centers or initiatives) that 
could ensure access to works on a large scale.72 At present, a library 
cannot produce multiple copies of a textbook, or larger portions within, 
to satisfy demands for access by poorer students or other readers. 
 
 
63 Farida Shaheed, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, 
Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and Culture, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/57 
(Dec. 24, 2014). 
64 See Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, 92 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 117, 117 (2014) 
(“Copyright protection is likely to be an ineffective incentive system for the production 
of works in ‘neglected languages’ spoken predominantly by poor people.”). 
65 Story, supra note 5, at 798. 
66 See Shaver, supra note 64, at 135 (Shaver describes current copyright law’s effect of 
discriminating on the ground of language. For South Africa, she says that copyright 
protection is failing in its intended purpose. “[The publishing] industry effectively serves 
only a tiny sliver of society . . . affluent English speakers. . . . Very few books are being 
produced in the needed languages . . . [spoken by] . . . the disadvantaged majority.”). 
67 Shaheed, supra note 63, ¶ 68. 
68 Id. ¶ 69. 
69 Kenneth D. Crews, Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and 
Archives: Updated and Revised (2017 Edition), World Intellectual Property Organization 
[WIPO], Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related Rights, at 6, SCCR/35/6 (Nov. 2, 
2017) [hereinafter Crews, L&Es for Libraries and Archives]. 
70 Id. at 8. 
71 Id. at 7. 
72 See Okediji, supra note 49, at 479–80, 491–92 (roughly making this proposition). 
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IV.   CONSTRAINTS OF CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW: THE BERNE 
APPENDIX 
The Appendix to the Berne Convention of 1971 (also made a part of 
TRIPS)73 provides for a compulsory licensing scheme, permitting 
translation or reproduction of a (whole) work against compensation 
without the consent of the copyright holder. Developing countries, as per 
U.N. definition, may avail themselves of the arrangements of the 
scheme.74 They must notify their intention to do so to WIPO.75 The 
scheme must then be implemented domestically. Licenses are to be 
granted by a “competent authority.”76 Whereas the L&Es discussed above 
relate to entitlements to utilize portions of a copyrighted work of which 
one holds a legitimate copy, the Berne Appendix is precisely about access 
to legitimate copies; it is about bulk access in developing countries, that 
is, the provision of multiple copies of a work at affordable prices.77 
Compulsory licensing under the Appendix is subject to complicated rules, 
however. Translation and reproduction licenses are governed separately. 
A translation license may be applied for if, three years after the first 
publication of a work, no translation into the relevant local language (“a 
language in general use” in the developing country) has been published 
(anywhere in the world) by, or with the consent of, the holder of the right 
of translation.78 A license may only be granted “for the purpose of 
teaching, scholarship or research.”79 A reproduction license may be 
applied for if, after five years80 of the first publication of a particular 
edition of a work, copies of such edition have not been distributed in the 
developing country to the general public, or in connection with systematic 
instructional activities, at a normal price in that country, by, or with the 
consent of, the holder of the right of reproduction.81 A license may only 
 
73 TRIPS, supra note 18, Art. 9(1). 
74 Berne Convention, supra note 19, app. at Art. I(1). 
75 Id. Broadly, a declaration in this regard is valid for ten years and may be renewed. Id. 
app. at Art. I(2). 
76 Id. app. at Arts. II(1), III(1). 
77 Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and 
Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries, at 15 (UNCTAD-ICTSD, 
Issue Paper No. 15, Mar. 2006), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf. 
78 Berne Convention, supra note 19, app. at Art. II(2)(a). In certain cases, the waiting 
period is less than three, but at least one year. Id. app. at Art. II(3). Translation licenses 
may also be applied for, under the same conditions, if all the editions of a published 
translation are out of print. Id. app. at Art. II(2)(b). “[A] language in general use” would 
include “the language of a small aboriginal tribe, regional languages, and ‘languages of 
government’ . . . in many former colonial territories.” RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra 
note 34, ¶ 14.64. Accordingly, even if the expression is vague (Silva, supra note 59, at 
605–607), the languages of cultural minorities would be covered. 
79 Berne Convention, supra note 19, app. at Art. II(5). 
80 Id. app. at Art. III(3). The waiting period is three years for works of the natural and 
physical sciences and of technology. It is seven years for works of fiction, poetry, drama 
and music and for art books. Id. app. at Art. III(3)(i), (ii), respectively. 
81 Id. app. at Art. III(2)(a). Reproduction licenses may also be applied for, under the same 
conditions, if no authorized copies of an edition have been on sale at a normal price for 
a period of six months. Id. app. at Art. III(2)(b). 




be granted “in connection with systematic instructional activities.”82 
“Teaching” (translation license) or “instruction” (reproduction license) 
includes non-commercial elementary as well as advanced teaching.83 
However, it seems neither license can be used to provide access beyond 
“organized” education.84 Hence, they cannot be relied on to stock local 
libraries or community centers—which may play a crucial role in informal 
education—with (multiple) copies of (translated) textbooks.85 
Furthermore, reproduced copies cannot be made available for free to 
students. The Appendix requires the charging of the normal or a lower 
price.86 
Where a translation or reproduction license is applied for, the 
Appendix further requires a grace period to elapse, beyond the time-limits 
mentioned, before the license may be granted.87 This is to allow the 
copyright holder to have a translation published at a price normal for the 
developing country, or to have copies of an edition distributed in that 
country at a normal price, within that period in order to avoid a license 
being granted.88 Accordingly, the grace period is meant to give the 
original copyright holder every opportunity to supply the local market 
concerned.89 Moreover, it should also be noted that if an author chooses 
to exercise his or her moral right to withdraw all copies of the work or the 
specific edition from circulation, no license can be granted,90 suggesting 
that in certain cases, works could be completely out of reach of users in 
developing countries.91 
It appears that it is the states themselves, or state-owned enterprises, 
that may apply for licenses under the Appendix.92 Importantly, a license 
may only be granted if it has been shown that the copyright holder has 
 
82 Id. app. at Art. III(2)(a). 
83 See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 34, ¶¶ 14.68, 14.86 (in effect, making this 
point). 
84 “Scholarship,” as an adjunct to “teaching” (translation license), appears to mean 
“organised educational activities” beyond “instructional activities . . . in . . . schools, 
colleges, and universities.” Id. ¶ 14.68 (emphasis added). “Systematic instructional 
activities” (reproduction license) appear to cover forms of “out-of-school education.” Id. 
¶ 14.86. In both instances, the reference seems to be to types of systematic, non-formal 
(not informal) education. Systematic instructional activities further do not encompass 
research. Id. ¶ 14.86. 
85 See Caroline B. Ncube, Calibrating Copyright for Creators and Consumers: 
Promoting Distributive Justice and Ubuntu, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE 
COPYRIGHT? 253, 270 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017) (cannot be 
used for purposes of cultural enrichment or literacy). 
86 Berne Convention, supra note 19, app. at Art. III(2)(a). 
87 Id. app. at Arts. II(4)(a), III(4)(a), (b), respectively. The grace period is between three 
and nine months. Id. 
88 Id. app. at Arts. II(4)(b), III(4)(c), respectively. If these measures take place after a 
compulsory license has been granted, the license will terminate. Existing copies may, 
however, be distributed. Id. app. at Arts. II(6), III(6), respectively. 
89 Okediji, supra note 77, at 15. 
90 Berne Convention, supra note 19, app. at Arts. II(8), III(4)(d), respectively. 
91 Okediji, supra note 77, at 15. 
92 HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 338. Some of the preparatory works indicate that 
private companies or charitable organizations were also considered entitled to apply. See 
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 34, ¶¶ 14.63, 14.81 (referring to the various views). 
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been approached and has denied consent, or, that, after due diligence, the 
copyright holder could not be traced.93 The Appendix provides for just 
compensation to be paid to copyright holders.94 Licenses usually do not 
extend to the export of copies and they permit publication within the 
granting country only.95 Export and import licenses would, however, be 
of vital importance in developmental contexts.96 Developing countries 
will often lack manufacturing capacities or have a book market which is 
too small to justify publication in the circumstances.97 Similar concerns 
may frequently be raised with regard to language minorities, as 
developing communities, in developed states. In the absence of a local 
book market for the languages concerned, the kin state of a language 
minority (that is, the “mother state” of a minority by virtue of ethnic or 
cultural affinity, as opposed to the “host state”) will often be in the best 
position to produce books for that minority. The initial problem here, of 
course, is that the Appendix does not apply to developed states 
whatsoever.98 
The Appendix has not been a success. Only 18 countries worldwide 
have made declarations relating to the Appendix so far.99 In 2013, only 
three countries could be identified as having implemented the mechanism 
into domestic law.100 As for Africa, only four countries (Algeria, Egypt, 
Niger, and Sudan) have made declarations relating to the Appendix.101 It 
seems only Uganda, not even a party to the Berne Convention, has 
implemented the mechanism.102 Simultaneously—as may be confirmed 
for developing states generally—various African states, beyond the 
Appendix framework, provide for arrangements adjusting those of the 
Appendix to develop highly idiosyncratic national solutions.103 As 
 
93 Berne Convention, supra note 19, app. at Art. IV(1). There are documentation 
requirements in the latter case. The applicant must send copies of the application to a 
“national or international information center” specified by the government of the country 
in which the publisher is believed to have the principal place of business. Id. app. at 
Art. IV(2). 
94 Id. app. at Art. IV(6)(a)(i). 
95 Id. app. at Art. IV(4). Offshore printing (not publishing) appears permissible, though. 
Overcoming border measures may, however, be a complicated issue. On the legitimacy 
of offshore printing, see Silva, supra note 59, at 618 and the various sources cited there. 
96 Id. at 617–19, 628–29. 
97 Id. at 628. 
98 See id. at 622–23, 628–29 (pointing out these deficits of the Appendix with regard to 
language minorities, as developing communities, in developed states). 
99This information has been drawn from the website of WIPO, 
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm.jsp?search_what=N (last visited Mar. 13, 
2019). 
100 Silva, supra note 59, at 594. 
101This information has been drawn from the website of WIPO, 
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm.jsp?search_what=N (last visited Mar. 13, 
2019) (Alg. (1994–2004, 2012–14, 2014–24), Egypt (1984–94), Niger (1974–84), Sudan 
(2004–14)). 
102Dick Kawooya, Ronald Kakungulu & Jeroline Akubu, Uganda, in ACCESS TO 
KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT 281, 283, 288 (Chris Armstrong et 
al. eds., 2010). 
103 See Silva, supra note 59, at 590–605 (reporting on developing countries generally, 
 




Alberto Cerda Silva describes it, “developing countries are doing it their 
own way.”104 On the one hand, it remains a question whether the 
respective arrangements are in compliance with international copyright 
law. On the other, domestic authorities, fearing that they are not, do not, 
in fact, implement them.105 As for Africa, for instance, “research . . . did 
not reveal any license granted within the framework of these 
provisions.”106 
Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg comment that 
[i]t is hard to point to any obvious benefits that have flowed 
directly to developing countries from the adoption of the 
Appendix. . . . The fact that, to date, so few developing countries 
have invoked the Appendix may be an indication that authors and 
publishers in the developed countries have been far more willing 
to license their works than was previously the case. [An] 
[a]lternative explanation[] . . . [may be] . . . that the social and 
economic problems of some of these countries are so intense that 
concern about copyright matters is not going to be a high 
priority.107 
 
Probably, the social and economic problems are so intense that the 
Appendix’s way of addressing acute access needs is completely out of 
touch with reality. Silva holds that 
[t]he Appendix of the Berne Convention does not work because it 
does not meet the needs of developing countries. Instead, the 
Appendix comes across as an obsolete, inappropriate, 
bureaucratic, and extremely limited attempt to provide an air valve 
for developing countries.108 
 
Ruth Okediji is also very outspoken. “By all accounts,” she says, the 
Berne Appendix has been “a failure.”109 Effective application of the 
 
comments also covering African states). See also Joseph Fometeu, Study on Limitations 
and Exceptions for Copyright and Related Rights for Teaching in Africa, World 
Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related 
Rights, at 42, SCCR/19/5 (Oct. 26, 2009) (reporting on African states). Countries in this 
group include Angola, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), 
Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and Togo. Id. 
104 Silva, supra note 59, at 598 (capitalization omitted). 
105 See id. at 604 (raising these concerns). 
106 Fometeu, supra note 103, at 42. 
107 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 34, ¶ 14.106. 
108 Silva, supra note 59, at 590. 
109 Okediji, supra note 77, at 15. Likewise, see, e.g., Salah Basalamah, Compulsory 
Licensing for Translation: An Instrument of Development?, 40 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 503, 
546 (2000) (observing notably “lack of consistence . . . with the developing countries’ 
needs”); Chon, supra note 15, at 829, 835 (remarking that the Appendix “contains 
provisions so complex and arcane that very few developing countries have been able or 
willing to take advantage of them,” and further that its provisions are unworkable, unfair, 
and require compensation for educational use that is covered by fair use in the U.S.); 
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 20, at 104 (concluding, “it is 
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arrangements depends on developing countries enacting specific 
legislation and establishing an elaborate administrative implementation 
system, requiring expertise and resources already scarce in most of these 
countries.110 The discussion above has illustrated the complex and 
onerous requirements associated with the use of the Appendix—waiting 
periods of up to seven years, additional grace periods, notification to the 
copyright holder—and the many other limitations of the Appendix. 
Overall, the text conveys the impression that the granting of compulsory 
licenses is to be avoided by all means. 
V.   THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND ACCESS TO TEXTBOOKS 
The right to education is a “hybrid” right, evidencing characteristics 
of civil and political, economic, social and cultural, and group or 
solidarity rights—therefore, of all three generations of human rights.111 It 
covers classical freedoms in education (first generation rights), 
encompasses positive state duties to set up a comprehensive education 
system (second generation rights), and—very important in the context of 
this discussion—also implicates the right to development (and other third 
generation rights). In his recent book on Development and the Right to 
Education in Africa, Azubike Onuora-Oguno accordingly emphasizes the 
“inextricable link” between the right to education and the right to 
development.112 The right to education, understood as a right to 
development, entitles nations—and simultaneously individuals and 
certain groups such as minorities or indigenous peoples within a state—
vis-à-vis their own state and the community of states collectively, to 
meaningfully participate in achieving, and to enjoy, their freely chosen 
socio-economic, cultural, and political progress113 through education. The 
right to education is, moreover, an “empowerment right,” that is, a human 
right whose enjoyment constitutes a prerequisite for the exercise of most 
 
clear to us that the special provisions . . . as set out in the Appendix, have not been 
effective”); Fometeu, supra note 103, at 6 (holding that “these licenses have been 
undermined by an extremely complex procedure which hampers their implementation”); 
Story, supra note 5, at 768–69 (making the sobering statement that “[t]he one addition 
made to Berne . . . which purported to improve the situation of poor countries—
incorporation of the Paris Appendix—has certainly not done so”). 
110 Ncube, supra note 85, at 273. 
111 On the right to education as a “hybrid” right, see KLAUS D. BEITER, THE PROTECTION 
OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION BY INTERNATIONAL LAW: INCLUDING A SYSTEMATIC 
ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 37–43 (2006). 
112 Azubike C. Onuora-Oguno, Development and the Right to Education in Africa 45 
(2019). The author stresses “the need to drive development in Africa by relying on the 
place of an enhanced access to quality education.” Id. at 2. 
113 This definition perhaps broadly reflects the present-day acquis of wisdom as to the 
gist of the right to development. For a good analysis of the right to development, see, 
e.g., Arjun Sengupta, On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development, 24 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 837 (2002). “The right-holder may be a collective . . ., but the beneficiary of the 
exercise of the right has to be the individual. . . . [T]he collective right . . . [is] . . . built 
on individual rights.” Id. at 862–63. 




other human rights.114 
The most prominent formulation of the right to education in IHRL is 
that found in Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966.115 With its 171 states 
parties (including China, but not the United States), the Covenant, and its 
Article 13, enjoy almost universal acceptance.116 If a common 
denominator exists in the way that international human rights treaties, 
such as the ICESCR, protect the right to education, then it looks as 
follows:117 there is usually a provision defining the aims of education, 
notably emphasizing that education should be directed to “the full 
development of the human personality.”118 Then there would be a 
provision calling upon states parties to make education at the primary, 
secondary, tertiary, and fundamental or adult levels available and 
accessible to varying degrees. State obligations would be formulated in a 
more rigorous fashion for the lower or basic levels and a less rigorous 
fashion for the higher or advanced levels.119 Where the provision of 
infrastructure and resources reflects the social or positive aspect of the 
right to education, the typical texts on the right to education would usually 
further contain provisions setting out the freedom or negative aspect of 
the right to education. This refers to notably the right of parents to guide 
their children’s religious and moral education in conformity with their 
own convictions and everybody’s right to set up private educational 
institutions.120 The right to education in its developmental dimension is 
particularly evident in Article 28(3) of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child of 1989.121 This states: 
States Parties shall promote and encourage international 
cooperation in matters relating to education, in particular with a 
view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance and illiteracy 
throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and 
 
114 On the right to education as an “empowerment right,” see BEITER, supra note 111, at 
28–30. 
115 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Arts. 13, 14, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
116 Status of ratification as on Aug. 15, 2020, see United Nations Treaty Collection, 
Status of Treaties, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4. Thirteen declarations or reservations have been made by states parties 
with regard to Article 13. Of relevance in the context of this discussion would be the five 
(contentious) statements by Bangladesh, Barbados, Madagascar, South Africa, and 
Zambia to the effect of reserving the right to implement free primary education in 
Article 13(2)(a) progressively rather than immediately, as would be required by 
Article 13(2)(a). Id. 
117 For a comprehensive discussion of the protection of the right to education by 
international law, including by relevant human rights treaties, see BEITER, supra 
note 111. 
118 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 115, Art. 13(1), 2d, 3d sentence. 
119 See, e.g., id. Art. 13(2)(a)–(e). 
120 See, e.g., id. Art. 13(3), (4), respectively. 
121 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 28(3), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). Articles 28 and 29 of the Convention protect the right 
to education. Id. Arts. 28, 29. 
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technical knowledge and modern teaching methods. In this regard, 
particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing 
countries. 
Reverting to the social or positive aspect of the right to education, 
specifically the issue of available, free education: primary education must 
usually be compulsory and available free to all.122 Secondary education 
must be made generally available and accessible to all; higher education 
must be made equally accessible to all those with capacity—in both 
instances accessibility is to be advanced “by every appropriate means, and 
in particular by the progressive introduction of free education.”123 In 
accordance with accepted human rights doctrine, the obligation that 
compulsory and free primary education be available to all is a so-called 
minimum core obligation.124 This means that should primary education 
not be generally available, compulsory, and free, this constitutes a prima 
facie violation of the right to education.125 Further, while states parties 
enjoy a certain measure of discretion when it comes to determining means 
and pace of making secondary and higher education free, they are not 
allowed to take deliberately retrogressive measures in as far as 
 
122 ICESCR, supra note 115, Art. 13(2)(a) (“Primary education shall be compulsory and 
available free to all.”). 
123 Id. Art. 13(2)(b), (c), respectively (“Secondary education in its different forms, 
including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally 
available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the 
progressive introduction of free education.”; “Higher education shall be made equally 
accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular 
by the progressive introduction of free education.”). A purposive interpretation of 
Article 13(2)(a) and (b) in light of the provisions of the ILO’s Minimum Age 
Convention, linking the minimum age for admission to employment to the age of 
completion of compulsory schooling, and stipulating that the former must not be less 
than fifteen years, means that also lower secondary education (years seven to nine of 
schooling in terms of UNESCO’s 2011 International Standard Classification of 
Education) must be compulsory—and also available free to all—without extensive delay 
(education can ultimately not be made compulsory if it is not also made free). See 
BEITER, supra note 111, at 303, 390, 519 (making this argument); Convention 
Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, Art. 2(3), June 26, 1973, 
I.L.O. Convention No. 138, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (entered into force June 19, 1976); 
UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD CLASSIFICATION OF EDUCATION: ISCED 2011, 
¶¶ 122, 141, 146 (2012). The highest standard with respect to free education is that set 
out in the Council of Europe’s Revised European Social Charter, obliging states parties 
to provide “a free primary and secondary education.” European Social Charter (Revised), 
Art. 17(2), May 3, 1996, 2151 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force July 1, 1999). 
124 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], General Comment No. 13, 
The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the ICESCR), ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 
(Dec. 8, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 13]. In fact, in light of the comments 
made supra in note 123, compulsory and free education for all up to the age of fifteen 
years (thus including lower secondary education) should be held to constitute the 
minimum core obligation. See BEITER, supra note 111, at 643–47 (making this 
argument). 
125 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 59. Minimum core obligations are 
imposed because, not guaranteeing minimum essential levels of socio-economic 
provision deprives socio-economic rights of their raison d’être. U.N. Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], General Comment No. 3, The Nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations (Art. 2(1) of the ICESCR), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 3]. Non-compliance with a minimum core obligation 
automatically constitutes a prima facie violation of rights. Id. 




(progressively) free education is concerned. Deliberately retrogressive 
measures in the provision of education are forbidden as a matter of 
principle.126 Consequently, introducing or increasing costs in secondary 
or higher education constitutes a prima facie violation of the right to 
education.127 Any justification for either type of prima facie violation—
non-compliance with a minimum core obligation or deliberately 
retrogressive measures—would have to be related to legitimate pressing 
concerns and the full use of the maximum resources available to a state 
party.128 
To dwell on the social or positive aspect of the right to education a bit 
further: The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR)—the independent expert body supervising implementation of 
the ICESCR—in its authoritative interpretation of Article 13 of the 
Covenant, General Comment No. 13, points out that education at all levels 
must be, inter alia, available, accessible, and acceptable.129 
“Availability” refers to the provision of schools and teachers, and, as 
the Committee stresses, also teaching materials and facilities such as a 
library.130 Already in 1981, a study had found that—compared to other 
potential correlates of school achievement, such as teacher-training, class 
size, or teacher salaries—the availability of books is particularly 
consistently associated with higher levels of achievement.131 Subsequent 
studies have confirmed this.132 However, textbooks are scarce in Africa. 
The textbook famine in Africa has been referred to above.133 As for the 
situation of libraries of educational institutions in Africa, the overall 
situation is sobering as well. University libraries are typically in a poor 
state.134 For libraries in secondary schools, the World Bank in 2008 
reports 
[s]eriously inadequate funding, with little or no government 
financial support. . . . Where library stock exists it is generally old 
and often irrelevant to current curricula and teacher/student 
interests. More often than not there is virtually no appropriate 
stock available at all and there are rarely budgets for stock 
 
126 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 45. Deliberately retrogressive measures 
are forbidden in the provision of any socio-economic benefit protected by socio-
economic rights. General Comment No. 3, supra note 125, ¶ 9. 
127 On the impermissibility of retrogressive measures, notably in the form of introducing 
or increasing costs in secondary or higher education, see BEITER, supra note 111, at 387–
89, 400–401, 457–58, 572–73, 592, 594, 650–51. 
128 Rendered here in simplified terms: General Comment No. 3, supra note 125, ¶¶ 9, 
10; General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶¶ 45, 57. 
129 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 6. 
130 Id. ¶ 6(a). 
131 Stephen P. Heyneman, Joseph P. Farrell & Manuel A. Sepulveda-Stuardo, Textbooks 
and Achievement in Developing Countries: What We Know, 13 J. CURRIC. STUD. 227, 
227 (1981). 
132 See, e.g., READ, supra note 12, at 33 (“The evidence for the impact of textbook 
provision on student achievement in repeated research studies over the past 40 years is 
overwhelmingly positive.”). 
133 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
134 COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 20, at 103. 
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upgrading or replenishment.135 
 
“Accessibility” refers to the abolition or reduction of school or 
university fees and also to the elimination of other impediments to access, 
such as race or gender discrimination.136 Hence, the cost of textbooks 
should also not constitute an impediment to access. The question, of 
course, is whether “free” education in Article 13(2) actually includes 
textbooks. The Committee has held that “free” means 
[the absence of] [f]ees imposed by the Government, the local 
authorities or the school, and other direct costs. . . . Indirect costs 
. . . can also fall into the same category. Other indirect costs may 
be permissible, subject to the Committee’s examination on a case-
by-case basis.137 
 
Textbooks are commonly an example of an indirect cost. The 
Committee’s Concluding Observations—which comment on a state 
party’s compliance with Covenant obligations, following submission by 
that state party, in regular intervals, of a report elaborating on its 
implementation of the Covenant—seem to show that the Committee 
requires states parties to make textbooks at the secondary (or higher) level 
progressively, and at the primary level immediately, free for students. The 
Committee has thus called upon a state party to “gradually reduce the 
costs of secondary education, e.g. through subsidies for textbooks.”138 
Regarding another state party, the Committee categorially stated that it “is 
concerned about indirect costs in primary education, such as for 
textbooks.”139 Those acquainted with the Committee’s working methods 
will know that, whenever the Committee “expresses its concern” at a 
situation, this may be considered indicative of a prima facie violation of 
human rights. 
 
135 WORLD BANK, TEXTBOOKS AND SCHOOL LIBRARY PROVISION IN SECONDARY 
EDUCATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 71–72 (World Bank Working Paper No. 126, 
2008). 
136 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 6(b). 
137 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], General Comment No. 11, 
Plans of Action for Primary Education (Art. 14 of the ICESCR), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/4 (May 10, 1999). This is to be read with General Comment No. 13, supra 
note 124, ¶¶ 10, 14, 20, making the definition of “free” in General Comment No. 11 
applicable to primary, secondary, and higher education, respectively. 
138 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], Concluding Observations 
on the Initial Report of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/MKD/CO/1 (Jan. 15, 2008). 
139 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], Concluding Observations 
on the Initial to Third Reports of the United Republic of Tanzania, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/TZA/CO/1-3 (Dec. 13, 2012). The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights has clearly stated that the right to free primary education under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights—which, in Article 17(1), succinctly provides 
that “[e]very individual shall have the right to education”—entails the “provision of free 
textbooks.” African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 17(1), June 27, 
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter 
African (Banjul) Charter]; Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, ¶ 71(b) (2011). 




“Free” education does not mean that textbooks must not cost anything. 
It just means that they, or their use, should be free for the end user, that 
is, the student. The cost of textbooks is the responsibility of the state. 
However, there is this inevitable correlation: where textbooks are 
expensive, it will be difficult for the state to bear that responsibility. 
Ultimately, students or their parents tend to be the ones bearing the cost—
sometimes very indirectly through diverse compulsory, or notionally 
voluntary, other levies on students and their parents that educational 
institutions charge to supplement their state-allocated funds. At the upper 
secondary and higher levels of education, “free” education is subject to 
the notion of progressiveness. To the extent that upper secondary and 
higher education are still in the process of being made progressively 
free—a process that may, of course, take many years, even in developed 
countries—and students or their parents are (still) required to bear (a 
portion of) textbook costs, high prices will similarly tend to be at the 
expense of students and their parents. The reality of textbook cost for the 
African continent has been described as follows: 
Primary textbooks are dominantly funded by the state even though 
budgets are widely considered to be inadequate, irregular, and 
unpredictable.140 . . . Secondary textbooks are more widely subject 
to parental contributions even though a majority of parents 
probably cannot afford the costs of the specified textbooks and 
this has a clear impact on the quality of education that can be 
achieved.141 . . . [There is a] continued dependence, particularly at 
upper secondary grades, on imported textbooks carrying 
developed world overheads and profit expectations.142 
 
Copyright contributes to cost and severely complicates reprography. 
Specifically with copyright in mind, a study has suggested that, rather 
than procuring textbooks through (international) competitive bidding, it 
would be advantageous if textbooks were developed by subject experts 
identified by state agencies and went through “an extensive, well-defined 
consultation and evaluation process” to ensure adequate attention is paid 
to quality of content. Such an approach would eliminate the publisher as 
a middleman and enable the government to retain copyright, making 
reprints cheaper.143 
“Acceptability” means that education itself must conform to 
established human rights standards, be relevant, of good quality, and 
culturally appropriate.144 Quality includes, inter alia, “a focus on the 
quality . . . of teaching and learning . . . materials.”145 Acceptability 
 
140 READ, supra note 12, at 68. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 13. 
143 BIRGER FREDRIKSEN, SUKHDEEP BRAR & MICHAEL TRUCANO, GETTING TEXTBOOKS 
TO EVERY CHILD IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING THE HIGH 
COST AND LOW AVAILABILITY PROBLEM 104 (World Bank, 2015). 
144 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 6(c). 
145 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 1, The Aims of 
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further entails that opportunities for instruction in the mother tongue must 
be maximized.146 Note may thus be taken of the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) important Hague 
Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National 
Minorities of 1996, a document purporting to be a consolidation of 
international legal obligations relating to the education rights of national 
minorities—that is, of the various language and cultural groups in any 
state.147 For primary education, it is stipulated that “the curriculum should 
ideally be taught in the minority language,”148 for secondary education 
that “a substantial part of the curriculum should be taught through the 
medium of the minority language,”149 and for higher education that there 
should be “access to tertiary education in [one’s] own language,” in 
accordance with need and student numbers.150 A World Bank report of 
2005 points out, research shows that first language instruction resulted in 
increased access and equity, improved learning outcomes, reduced 
repetition and dropout rates, socio-cultural benefits, and lower overall 
costs.151 Obviously, textbooks in the relevant language will play a crucial 
role in this context. As a recent World Bank study, based on research 
evidence, remarks, “for textbooks to be effective they must be not only 
available but also . . . in a language that is widely understood by students 
and teachers.”152 Yet, close to 40 percent of the world’s population do not 
have access to education in their mother tongue and, therefore, are 
“potentially negatively affected” by official policy on language in 
education.153 While 599 languages, including the “global” or known 
languages, are used in education, 7670 are not.154 Specifically for the 
African context, it has been stated that 
[t]here must be a move away from the banking and bookish model 
of education, which is a result of teaching through a language 
unfamiliar to both teachers and students, to a more active, 
empowering and transformative educational model based on 
African realities and educational needs and conducted in African 
 
Education (Art. 29(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child), ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/GC/2001/1 (Apr. 17, 2001). 
146 BEITER, supra note 111, at 493. 
147 THE HAGUE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE EDUCATION RIGHTS OF NATIONAL 
MINORITIES & EXPLANATORY NOTE 3 (OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, 1996). 
148 Id. Recomm. 12. 
149 Id. Recomm. 13. 
150 Id. Recomm. 17. 
151 Penelope Bender et al., In their Own Language: Education for All, EDUC. NOTES 
(World Bank, June 2005), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/374241468763515925/pdf/389060Languag
e00of1Instruct01PUBLIC1.pdf. 
152 READ, supra note 12, at 33. 
153 Stephen L. Walter & Carol Benson, Language Policy and Medium of Instruction in 
Formal Education, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE POLICY 278, 282 
(Bernard Spolsky ed., 2012). 
154 Id. at 283. 






Hence, UNESCO reminds states that “[t]he production and 
distribution of teaching materials and learning resources and any other 
reading materials in mother tongues should be promoted.”156 In 2015, the 
CESCR, in its Concluding Observations, had expressed its concern at the 
situation of minority education in a state party. Inter alia, the Committee 
was concerned at “a shortage of textbooks in minority languages.”157 
Again, the language of “concern” indicates that human rights (seem to) 
have been violated. 
VI.   EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
With the right to education prominently protected in Article 13 of the 
ICESCR, note should be taken of Article 2(1) of the Covenant, which 
could be seen as embodying the notion of extraterritorial state obligations 
(ETOs) to fulfill the right to education and other Covenant rights. It lays 
down the general obligation of states parties to progressively realize 
Covenant rights—therefore also the right to education in Article 13—
“individually and through international assistance and co-operation.”158 
While the Covenant’s travaux préparatoires seem not to provide a basis 
for “hard law” obligations of state parties to render international 
assistance and co-operation,159 Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, in a 
ground-breaking 1987 article on the nature and scope of state obligations 
under the Covenant assert that, “[i]n the context of a given right it may, 
according to the circumstances, be possible to identify obligations to 
cooperate internationally that would appear to be mandatory on the basis 
of the undertaking contained in Article 2(1) of the Covenant,”160 
moreover, that trends in the arena of international development co-
operation could subsequently require a reinterpretation in support of legal 
 
155 Birgit Brock-Utne & Hassana Alidou, Active Students: Learning through a Language 
They Master, in OPTIMISING LEARNING, EDUCATION AND PUBLISHING IN AFRICA: THE 
LANGUAGE FACTOR 187, 215 (Adama Ouane & Christine Glanz eds., 2011). 
156 UNESCO Guidelines on Language and Education, Principle I(II), in EDUCATION IN 
A MULTILINGUAL WORLD 31 (UNESCO, 2003), 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000129728. 
157 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], Concluding Observations 
on the Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of Tajikistan, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/TJK/CO/2-3 (Mar. 25, 2015). 
158 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
ICESCR, supra note 115, Art. 2(1). 
159 Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 156, 188–91 (1987) (analyzing the Covenant’s travaux préparatoires on the point). 
160 Id. at 191. 




In 1990 the CESCR, in its influential General Comment No. 3, held 
that international co-operation for development is “an obligation . . . 
particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position to assist 
others.”162 In arriving at this conclusion, the Committee relied, inter alia, 
on Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter. While Article 55 mentions the 
promotion of “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights” as 
a U.N. goal in the sphere of socio-economic development,163 Article 56 
lays down the “pledge” of U.N. members “to take joint and separate action 
in cooperation with the Organization” for the achievement of this and the 
other goals of Article 55.164 Commenting on the right to education in 
Article 13, this author has previously emphasized that, unless such a 
purposive interpretation of the Covenant’s assistance and co-operation 
obligations is adopted, the full realization of economic, social, and 
cultural rights in developing states might well never be achieved.165 In as 
far as the actual provision of development aid is concerned, it has since 
1970 been recognized that donor states should allocate 0.7 percent of their 
gross national income to official development assistance (ODA).166 
The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in 
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 2011, a document 
prepared by a group of experts in international law, addressing all three 
dimensions of human rights obligations, recognizes that states have 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill civil, political, economic, social, 
and cultural rights within their territories and extraterritorially.167 ETOs 
 
161 Id. at 191–92. 
162 General Comment No. 3, supra note 125, ¶ 14. 
163 U.N. Charter Art. 55(c). 
164 Id. Art. 56. 
165 BEITER, supra note 111, at 380 n.35. 
166 See DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE, HISTORY OF THE 0.7% ODA TARGET 
(DAC, Mar. 2016), https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-history-of-the-0-7-target.pdf. 
167 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE 
AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, Principle 3 (2011) [hereinafter 
MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES]. For a reproduction of, and commentary to, the Maastricht 
Principles, see Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012). For commentary on Principle 3, see id. at 1090–
96. The Maastricht Principles may be regarded as reflective of the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists as a subsidiary means in determining rules of international 
law in the sense of Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
Meanwhile, there exists a notable body of literature on ETOs in the field of human rights. 
Academic books on ETOs that also address ETOs in the field of economic, social, and 
cultural rights include FONS COOMANS & MENNO T. KAMMINGA eds., 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2004); FONS COOMANS 
& ROLF KÜNNEMANN eds., CASES AND CONCEPTS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 
IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2012); MARK GIBNEY & 
SIGRUN SKOGLY eds., UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL 
OBLIGATIONS (2010); MICHAŁ GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
GLOBALISING WORLD: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
(2009); TAHMINA KARIMOVA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2016); MALCOLM LANGFORD ET AL. eds., GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE 
 





a) obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within 
or beyond its territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of 
human rights outside of that State’s territory; and 
b) obligations of a global character that are set out in the Charter 
of the United Nations and human rights instruments to take action, 
separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to 
realize human rights universally.168 
 
ETOs to fulfill entail positive duties, and encompass, on the one hand, 
obligations to facilitate, requiring states to create an international enabling 
environment that allows for the realization of human rights in other states, 
and, on the other, obligations to provide, requiring states to provide 
financial, technical, co-operative, and other assistance, according to 
ability, where human rights in another state can otherwise not be 
guaranteed.169 Less contentious than ETOs to fulfill are negative duties to 
respect and even positive duties to protect human rights extraterritorially. 
ETOs to respect oblige states to refrain from conduct that nullifies or 
impairs the enjoyment of human rights (for example, by reversing their 
levels of realization) of persons outside their territories, or which impairs 
 
EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); MARGOT E. SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS: WORLD POVERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2007); MARGOT E. SALOMON, ARNE TOSTENSEN & WOUTER VANDENHOLE eds., 
CASTING THE NET WIDER: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND NEW DUTY-BEARERS 
(2007); SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES’ HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2006); WOUTER VANDENHOLE ed., 
CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A 
PLURAL AND DIVERSE DUTY-BEARER REGIME (2015). For a list of articles, books, and 
documents, visit the website of the ETO Consortium, a network of human rights-related 
civil society organizations and academics advancing the cause of ETOs under IHRL, at 
https://www.etoconsortium.org. 
168 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, Principle 8 (Definition of extraterritorial 
obligations). For commentary on Principle 8, see De Schutter et al., supra note 167, at 
1101–104. 
169 These definitions are broadly based on those proposed by a former U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, who specifically also uses the terms 
“fulfil,” “facilitate,” and “provide” in this regard. Jean Ziegler, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, The Right to Food, ¶¶ 57, 58, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/47 (Jan. 24, 2005). See also MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, 
Principle 29 (Obligation to create an international enabling environment) and 
Principle 33 (Obligation to provide international assistance), as reflecting obligations to 
facilitate and to provide, respectively. In as far as compliance by states with their 
international human rights obligations within their respective territories is concerned, 
obligations to fulfill are usually categorized as positive obligations to facilitate 
(installing frameworks or systems, enabling individuals to exercise rights), to provide 
(making available actual hand-outs, money, and social assistance to individuals in case 
of need), and to promote (raising public awareness concerning rights, preparing the 
ground for subsequent realization). See, e.g., MANISULI SSENYONJO, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25–26 (2009) (broadly providing these 
definitions). 
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the ability of other states to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights.170 
ETOs to protect oblige states to protect individuals outside their territories 
against infringements of their rights as may be perpetrated by various 
private actors. In cases where a sufficient nexus exists between a state and 
the private actors concerned, these actors’ anticipated conduct, or the 
harm they might cause, protection is to occur by regulating the conduct of 
private actors through legal standard-setting, or administrative, 
investigative, adjudicatory, or other measures. Where, due to the absence 
of a sufficient nexus, regulation is not possible, but also generally, states 
should, to the extent possible, “influence” the conduct of private actors.171 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction arises by virtue of the fact that either: a 
state is the bearer of state authority (for example, it exercises effective 
control over foreign territory and persons there); its acts have foreseeable 
consequences on persons beyond its territory; or, regarding international 
assistance and co-operation, it is in a position to assist and co-operate.172 
In accordance with the latter, the Maastricht Principles identify the 
obligation of states “that are in a position to do so” separately and jointly 
to provide international assistance.173 The duty to seriously consider 
providing concrete assistance and co-operation is triggered by the related 
request of a state in need thereof.174 Assistance and co-operation is to be 
rendered commensurate with capacity, resources, and influence.175 Any 
assistance and co-operation rendered must itself observe international 
human rights standards, prioritize vulnerable groups, focus on minimum 
core obligations, and avoid retrogressive measures.176 In General 
Comment No. 13 on Article 13 of the ICESCR, the CESCR reaffirms “the 
obligation of States parties in relation to the provision of international 
assistance and co-operation for the full realization of the right to 
education.”177 
Four provisions laid down in the Maastricht Principles are of 
particular importance in a discussion of global copyright regulation and 
access to textbooks. Principle 15 states: 
As a member of an international organization, the State remains 
responsible for its own conduct in relation to its human rights 
obligations within its territory and extraterritorially. A State that 
 
170 This definition is broadly based on Maastricht Principle 20 (Direct interference) and 
Principle 21 (Indirect interference). MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, 
Principles 20–21. 
171 This definition is broadly based on Maastricht Principle 24 (Obligation to regulate), 
Principle 25 (Bases for protection), and Principle 26 (Position to influence). Id. 
Principles 24–26. 
172 Id. Principle 9 (Scope of jurisdiction) (mentioning these three bases for jurisdiction). 
For commentary on Principle 9, see De Schutter et al., supra note 167, at 1104–109. 
173 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, Principle 33. 
174 Id. Principle 35. As it were, where a state “is unable, despite its best efforts, to 
guarantee economic, social and cultural rights within its territory . . . [it] has the 
obligation to seek international assistance and cooperation.” Id. Principle 34. 
175 Id. Principle 31. 
176 Id. Principle 32(c), (a), (b), (d), respectively. On minimum core obligations and 
deliberately retrogressive measures, see also supra notes 125 & 126. 
177 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 56. 




transfers competences to, or participates in, an international 
organization must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
relevant organization acts consistently with the international 
human rights obligations of that State.178 
 
The first sentence points out that a state, as a member of an 
international organization, such as WIPO or the WTO, must do “what it 
reasonably can” to ensure that the organization as a whole acts in 
compliance with any human rights obligations of that state. Hence, that 
state’s conduct, within the organization, will be measured against human 
rights standards. The second sentence makes it clear that a state cannot 
relinquish any human rights obligations it has accepted by establishing, 
or by becoming a member of, an international organization that exercises 
competences formerly exercised by the state individually. Hence, the state 
must ensure that the international organization is set up and functions in 
accordance with the human rights obligations of that state. The CESCR, 
it may be noted, has stated specifically with regard to the right to 
education in Article 13 that “[s]tates parties have an obligation to ensure 
that their actions as members of international organizations . . . take due 
account of the right to education.”179 
Principle 17 provides that “States must elaborate, interpret and apply 
relevant international agreements and standards in a manner consistent 
with their human rights obligations.”180 In other words, states would have 
to ascertain, for example, whether copyright treaties to be adopted by 
WIPO, or any FTAs regulating copyright they are to become a party to, 
are consistent with their human rights obligations and do not jeopardize 
human rights domestically or abroad. WIPO treaties, TRIPS, and FTAs 
would have to be interpreted and applied in accordance with states’ 
human rights obligations. If need be, treaties must be amended. This 
applies to both Berne and TRIPS as well. In the context of discussing 
states parties’ assistance and co-operation obligations under the ICESCR 
in relation to the right to education, the CESCR states that, “[i]n relation 
to the negotiation and ratification of international agreements, States 
parties should take steps to ensure that these instruments do not adversely 
impact upon the right to education.”181 
Principle 29 stipulates: 
States must take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps, 
separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to create 
an international enabling environment conducive to the universal 
fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights, including in 
matters relating to bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, 
 
178 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, Principle 15 (Obligations of States as 
members of international organizations). For commentary on Principle 15, see 
De Schutter et al., supra note 167, at 1118–20. 
179 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 56. 
180 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, Principle 17 (International agreements). 
For commentary on Principle 17, see De Schutter et al., supra note 167, at 1122–24. 
181 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 56. 
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taxation, finance, environmental protection, and development 
cooperation. 
The compliance with this obligation is to be achieved through, 
inter alia: 
a) elaboration, interpretation, application and regular review 
of multilateral and bilateral agreements as well as international 
standards; 
b) measures and policies by each State in respect of its foreign 
relations, including actions within international organizations, 
and its domestic measures and policies that can contribute to 
the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights 
extraterritorially.182 
 
Principle 29 describes what have been termed ETOs to facilitate 
above. Compliance with this specimen of ETOs to fulfill “does not 
necessarily require resources or international aid.”183 There is, therefore, 
no easy defense for states not to comply with these ETOs. In the context 
of global copyright regulation and access to textbooks, ETOs to facilitate 
play, as the next section will show, an important role.184 Letter (a) 
reiterates ideas found in Principle 17, but also introduces the notion of 
states elaborating joint safeguard policies that buttress interpretations of 
the law supporting human rights, or of states adopting soft or hard law 
instruments that strengthen existing, or create new, standards protective 
of human rights. Letter (b) recognizes “humanitarian internationalism” as 
the legal duty of each state. Each state must, in its foreign relations, follow 
“a pattern of persistent principled politics” aimed at “implant[ing] a 
slowly emerging legitimacy norm—universal human rights.”185 Relevant 
unilateral domestic measures and policies must also be adopted to 
promote human rights extraterritorially. 
Finally, Principle 14 requires that “States must conduct prior 
assessment . . . of the risks and potential extraterritorial impacts of their 
laws, policies and practices on the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights.”186 Although also applicable to, for example, Berne or 
TRIPS, this principle assumes specific significance in relation to FTAs, 
which often regulate copyright and other IP matters. FTAs should, prior 
and subsequent to their conclusion, be subjected to human rights impact 
assessments, also with respect to their extraterritorial effects, to ensure 
 
182 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, Principle 29 (Obligation to create an 
international enabling environment). For commentary on Principle 29, see De Schutter 
et al., supra note 167, at 1146–49. 
183 Ziegler, supra note 169, ¶ 57. 
184 See infra Section VII. 
185 ALISON BRYSK, GLOBAL GOOD SAMARITANS: HUMAN RIGHTS AS FOREIGN POLICY 
Ch. 1 (2009). 
186 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, Principle 14 (Impact assessment and 
prevention). For commentary on Principle 14, see De Schutter et al., supra note 167, at 
1115–18. 




human rights, including the right to education, are observed.187 These 
assessments will indicate whether provisions need to be modified or 
deleted. Appropriate safeguard clauses may have to be included. A 
concluded FTA may even have to be terminated.188 
Concluding this part of the discussion, it may be noted that the (then) 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 2005 had appointed an 
Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity, 
notably tasked with preparing a draft declaration on the right of peoples 
and individuals to international solidarity, for ultimate adoption by the 
U.N. General Assembly. In 2017, Virginia Dandan, as the second expert 
in office, submitted a final draft to the Human Rights Council.189 This is 
very interesting to read—and, in many ways, confirms the ETOs concept 
as elucidated here. Article 4(1) postulates a right to international 
solidarity. It states: 
The right to international solidarity is a human right by which 
individuals and peoples are entitled, on the basis of equality and 
non-discrimination, to participate meaningfully in, contribute to 
and enjoy a social and international order in which all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.190 
 
This right is said to be grounded in the acquis of human rights 
protected in international human rights treaties, covering civil and 
political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights, and also the right to 
development.191 The linkage to the right to development, defined earlier 
on,192 is striking. International solidarity is held to “consist[] of preventive 
solidarity, reactive solidarity and international cooperation.”193 The latter, 
international cooperation, 
rests on the premise that some States may not possess the 
resources or capacity necessary for the full realization of the rights 
set forth in international human rights treaties. States in a position 
 
187 For an examination of methodologies for human rights impact assessments of IP 
rights in FTAs, see Lisa Forman & Gillian MacNaughton, Moving Theory into Practice: 
Human Rights Impact Assessment of Intellectual Property Rights in Trade Agreements, 
7 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 109 (2015). In a prominent instance, the CESCR has clearly called 
upon a state party to undertake a human rights impact assessment of TRIPS-plus 
provisions that could adversely affect human rights in partner countries. U.N. Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], Concluding Observations on the Second and 
Third Periodic Reports of Switzerland, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CHE/CO/2-3 (Nov. 26, 
2010). 
188 See Olivier De Schutter, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Addendum, Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and 
Investment Agreements, Guiding Principle 3, ¶ 3.3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 
(Dec. 19, 2011) (right of denunciation or withdrawal implied in any trade agreement 
where this is necessary to comply with human rights obligations). 
189 Virginia Dandan, Report of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and 
International Solidarity, Annex, Draft Declaration on the Right to International 
Solidarity, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/35 (Apr. 25, 2017). 
190 Id. Art. 4(1). 
191 Id. Art. 4(2). 
192 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
193 Draft Declaration, supra note 189, Art. 2(a), (b), (c). 
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to do so should provide international assistance, acting separately 
or jointly, to contribute to the fulfilment of human rights in other 
States in a manner consistent with the fundamental principles of 
international law and international human rights law.194 
 
Principal duty bearers are states. Article 6(1) accordingly stipulates: 
All States, whether acting individually or collectively, including 
through international or regional organizations of which they are 
members, have the primary duty to realize the right to 
international solidarity.195 
 
These provisions visibly allude to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR and its 
interpretation by the CESCR in its General Comments Nos. 3 and 13. As 
is known, General Assembly (human rights) declarations not only make 
a clear moral statement, but often constitute a first step in the evolution of 
binding (for example, customary) law. The preceding exposition should, 
however, have made it quite clear that ETOs under existing human rights 
treaties, in a large measure, already reflect “hard law” obligations. 
VII.   IDENTIFYING TYPICAL ETOS UNDER THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT CONTEXT THAT SAFEGUARD ACCESS 
TO TEXTBOOKS 
ETOs to respect, protect, and fulfill (covering obligations to facilitate 
and provide) the right to education under IHRL in the Berne, TRIPS, and 
FTA context, directed at safeguarding access to textbooks, include, inter 
alia, the obligations set out in this section. Although the obligations are 
presented as twenty separate ETOs here, there may be a measure of 
overlap between them in practice. Alternatively, fulfilling a certain 
obligation, may modify the nature of fulfillment for another. For the sake 
of easier reading, the twenty ETOs have been grouped into five clusters. 
The formulation of isolated ETOs (or “sub” ETOs) has been highlighted 
in each instance. 
A.   Respecting and Protecting the Right to Education 
1. Respect: WIPO members should not engage in any conduct in 
WIPO nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of the right to education in 
any member, or impairing that member’s ability to respect, protect, and 
fulfill the right to education. They must refrain from supporting policies 
or measures, or agreeing to provisions in (or adopting) copyright treaties, 
that have any such consequences. 
In this sense, IP experts have called for a moratorium on new or 
extended IP, including copyright protection, for example by way of WIPO 
 
194 Id. Art. 2(c) (emphasis added). 
195 Id. Art. 6(1). Article 6(2) identifies international organizations and non-state actors as 
further duty-bearers in certain respects. Id. Art. 6(2). 




treaties.196 As Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman explain, IP rights are 
structured around decisions on how to allocate public and private interests 
in knowledge goods. Because we are as yet lacking a sound 
understanding, based on actual evidence, of where to draw that line in 
different developmental contexts, taking into account genuine creative 
incentives generated and sustained by, and the anti-commons effects of 
such rights, we should not create new IP rights or extend existing ones. 
Ultimately, IP rights, by their very nature, restrict access to knowledge as 
a public good.197 The authors state: 
The time has come . . . to take intellectual property off the 
international law-making agenda and to foster measures that better 
enabled developing countries to adapt to the challenges that prior 
rounds of harmonization had already bred. . . . A moratorium on 
stronger international intellectual property standards would 
especially help developing countries shift their attention and 
limited resources away from compliance-driven initiatives toward 
programs to potentiate their national and regional systems of 
innovation.198 
 
The example of the moratorium captures the essence of the duty to 
respect as a negative obligation not to infringe human rights. Here it is the 
obligation not to do anything that increases levels of protection, in this 
case for copyright in learning materials, thereby (likely) violating the right 
to education. The moratorium, it should be noted, would be one not to 
enhance protection levels, not, however, one not to lower protection levels 
 
196 See, e.g., the Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, adopted by experts, NGOs, and many others representing civil society at 
a meeting on the “Future of WIPO” in Geneva in September 2004, 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf (urging that “[t]here must 
be a moratorium on new treaties and harmonization of standards that expand and 
strengthen monopolies and further restrict access to knowledge”); the Washington 
Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, adopted by experts at the 
Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, held at the American 
University in Washington, D.C., Aug. 25–27, 2011: The Washington Declaration on 
Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 19, 22 (2012) 
(under the heading “Valuing Openness and the Public Domain,” appealing to the IP 
community to “[a]dvocate for a permanent moratorium on further extensions of 
copyright, related rights and patent terms”); the RSA Adelphi Charter on Creativity, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property, adopted by the (U.K.) Royal Society for the 
Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA) in 2006: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND REWARDING CREATIVITY: A BALANCED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 4, 5 (RSA, 2006) (“There must be an automatic 
presumption against creating new areas of intellectual property protection, extending 
existing privileges or extending the duration of rights. . . . Change must be allowed only 
if a rigorous analysis clearly demonstrates that it will promote people’s basic rights and 
economic well-being.”). 
197 Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge 
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME 3, 36–39 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). While the 
authors’ argument has a basis in economic thinking, public goods-reasoning is in many 
ways mirrored normatively in human rights-reasoning. 
198 Id. at 37–38 (footnote omitted). 
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in accordance with the demands of human rights. In addition, there should 
also be a restraint on the adoption of soft law documents addressing IP 
standards, especially where instruments espouse a protectionist vision of 
IP. Instruments may, for instance, be recommendations and resolutions of 
WIPO committees. The various soft law documents “are already difficult 
to assess from a transparency standpoint, and yet they exert important 
influence on copyright law, sometimes as much as the treaty 
provisions.”199 
Likewise, WTO members should not engage in any actions in the 
WTO—and they must refrain from supporting WTO-TRIPS policies or 
measures—that infringe the right to education. 
2. Respect: Powerful WTO members should not compel 
developing members to subordinate to (assailable) conceptions of 
copyright protection that jeopardize access to textbooks. It has been noted 
that, given the three-step test is now part of TRIPS, an instrument with 
“teeth,” enacting domestic L&Es has become a risky and uncertain 
affair—policy-makers in developed countries will often communicate 
threats to their counterparts in developing countries.200 In the worst case, 
recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system may be threatened. 
Developing states must be held entitled to fully utilize the potential of 
open-ended provisions (for example, those restating the three-step test) 
and specific flexibilities provided for (for example, compulsory licenses 
or parallel imports)201 in Berne and TRIPS to protect the public interest in 
education. The famous 2002 Report of the U.K. Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights emphasized: 
[D]eveloping countries . . . need to be allowed greater freedom to 
relax international copyright rules to meet their educational and 
research needs. . . . Developing countries should be allowed to 
maintain or adopt broad exemptions for educational, research and 
library uses in their national copyright laws.202 
 
On the one hand, such an interpretation accords with the TRIPS 
objectives in Article 7 and the public interest principles of TRIPS in 
Article 8 of TRIPS. The overarching aim of Article 7 is to achieve balance 
in IP law—between IP rights as contributing to the creation and the 
dissemination of technological and other knowledge, between the rights 
 
199 Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in 
Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 197, 
at 142, 186. 
200 Okediji, supra note 49, at 480. See also Carlos Correa, Formulating Effective Pro-
Development National Intellectual Property Policies, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 209, 211 
(Christophe Bellmann, Graham Dutfield & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz eds., 2003) 
(“developing countries have been strongly lobbied or subject to political pressures to 
adopt IPR legislation that responds to the interests of industries from industrialized 
countries”). 
201 On compulsory licenses and parallel imports, see infra Section VII(D)(16). 
202 COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 20, at 104. 




of IP right holders and those of users (whether subsequent producers or 
end users), between the rights and the duties of IP right holders, and so 
on.203 Article 8(1) states that WTO members may adopt measures 
necessary to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
socio-economic development.204 Peter Yu has argued that Articles 7 and 
8, inter alia, have a “shielding” function, defending a member state’s use 
of the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement,205 by allowing 
interpretation of TRIPS through a prodevelopment lens.206 On the other 
hand—reverting to the theme of this Article—such an interpretation also 
accords with the right to education of IHRL. To be precise, such an 
interpretation in favor of the freedom to use flexibilities is a more 
immediate effect of an external ETO norm under the right to education of 
IHRL.207 
Supplementing the obligation as formulated above, powerful WTO 
members should not compel developing members to agree to terms in 
FTAs endorsing (assailable) conceptions of copyright protection that 
jeopardize access to textbooks. FTAs will, however, be commented on 
separately below.208 
3. Protect: Developed states should, to the extent possible, ensure 
that publishers sufficiently linked to their sphere of control, or whose 
conduct they can influence, do not exploit copyright to the detriment of 
students, parents, and teachers in developing states, for example by 
charging excessive prices for textbooks.209 Excessive pricing is facilitated 
by foreign firms being dominant in local book markets. Developed states 
should adopt rules for differential pricing, allowing for a reasonable 
 
203 Article 7 of TRIPS states: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations. 
TRIPS, supra note 18, Art. 7. 
204 Article 8 of TRIPS states: 
1.Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
2.Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. 
Id. Art. 8. 
205 Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the Trips Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 
979, 1025 (2009). 
206 Id. at 1027. 
207 In this regard, see further infra Section VII(C)(11) on treaty interpretation and the 
parts of Section VIII on the “constitutionalization” of IP law and the aspect of human 
rights priority. 
208 See infra Section VII(D)(17). 
209 See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 336 (observing that “[h]igher prices may be 
caused by the failure of multinational publishers to engage in differential pricing”). 
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profit, but requiring prices to correlate to percentages of per capita GNI 
expended for books, thus taking into account the circumstances of the 
countries concerned. Anticompetitive conduct “elsewhere” is as 
reprehensible as anticompetitive conduct “at home,” especially if it 
threatens human rights. Very much in line with this, Ruth Okediji has 
argued in favor of home countries bearing responsibility should their 
firms use IP rights in developing countries in a manner that prejudices 
access as a matter of public interest in those countries, for instance, by 
contravening competition principles.210 This is important especially 
where, as a result of the weakness of the local law or the absence of 
institutional capacity, the public interest cannot be vindicated in the host 
country concerned.211 
B.   A Road Map, Human Rights Impact Assessments, Reforming the 
Berne Appendix and TRIPS, and Bulk Access 
4. Facilitate: Each state should adopt policies, a road-map, as it 
were, with respect to its actions within the WIPO or WTO context, setting 
out how it can contribute to protecting the right to education, and other 
human rights, in that context.212 This is not to accord a(n) (unwarranted) 
mandate to WIPO or the WTO to realize human rights, but rather to ensure 
that, where these organizations’ conduct could have an impact on human 
rights, it should advance these, namely by preserving each state’s ability 
itself to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. The stated road-map 
should incorporate principles on voting or consensus behavior, regular 
dialogue with developing countries, proactive measures for reform or 
norm clarification, co-operative approaches with respect to countries 
struggling to comply with Berne or TRIPS, and so on. 
Furthermore, each state should adopt relevant unilateral domestic 
measures and policies that may promote the right to education, and other 
human rights, extraterritorially.213 By way of example, if developed states 
were to enact and liberally apply “fair use” provisions (covering 
educational uses) domestically, this could potentially facilitate the parallel 
importation of cheaper copyright-based educational materials that pass 
muster under fair use to developing states from those developed states.214 
5. Facilitate: WIPO and WTO members should subject WIPO 
treaties, such as the Berne Convention, and TRIPS to regular human rights 
impact assessments, to identify potential need for reform (reinterpretation 
or textual reform), directed at protecting the right to education or other 
human rights. The former U.N. Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural 
Rights, Farida Shaheed, thus urges that international copyright 
 
210 Okediji, supra note 26, at 240. 
211 Id. 
212 This is in direct application of Principle 29(b), first part, of the Maastricht Principles. 
MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 167, Principle 29(b), 1st part. See supra notes 182 
& 185 and accompanying text. 
213 This is in direct application of Principle 29(b), second part, of the Maastricht 
Principles. Id. Principle 29(b), 2d part. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
214 On “fair use,” see infra Section VII(D)(15), notes 297–304 and accompanying text. 




instruments should be subjected to human rights impact assessments.215 
These instruments “should never impede the ability of States to adopt 
exceptions and limitations that reconcile copyright protection with . . . 
human rights, based on domestic circumstances.”216 Article 20 of the 
Berne Convention reserves the right of Berne members to enter into 
“special agreements” among themselves—however, only “in so far as 
such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted 
by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to [the] 
Convention.”217 This automatically prevents the adoption of agreements 
providing for mechanisms that may enhance access. Treaties on L&Es for 
education and libraries, as referred to in Point 15 below,218 are rendered 
structurally impossible unless Article 20 undergoes revision.219 
Accordingly, any human rights impact assessment of the Berne 
Convention would clearly identify Article 20 as problematic from a 
human rights perspective and requiring modification. 
6. Facilitate: WIPO members should initiate, promote, and help 
realize a reform of the compulsory licensing scheme of the Berne 
Appendix to make this work for developing states: the distinction between 
translation and reproduction licenses should be eliminated and the 
simultaneous application for both licenses under the same conditions be 
allowed; waiting and grace periods should be abolished; seeking consent 
of the copyright holder should be dispensed with; licenses should be 
available with respect to informal education as well (stocking public 
libraries, community centers, and so on); licenses should be available 
when the author chooses to withdraw all copies of the work or the specific 
edition from circulation; distribution of free copies should be legitimate; 
just compensation to the copyright holder should be moderate and only 
paid to the extent that the latter loses any market opportunity; and 
publication should be permitted in another country for export to the 
country in need—even if for the benefit of a language minority as a 
developing community in a developed state.220 Altogether, procedures 
should be simplified and the reformed compulsory licensing scheme 
reflect “good will” on the part of developed countries. As Alberto Cerda 
Silva notes, “[i]f developed countries want developing countries to 
cooperate in the enforcement of intellectual property, it is necessary to 
work on an agenda that provides the latter with enough flexibility to meet 
their needs.”221 
7. Facilitate: WTO members should initiate, promote, and help 
realize a reform of TRIPS that safeguards the right to education and other 
 
215 Shaheed, supra note 63, ¶ 94. 
216 Id. ¶ 95. 
217 Berne Convention, supra note 19, Art. 20. 
218 See infra Section VII(D)(15). 
219 See also Okediji, supra note 199, at 183–84 (“I propose . . . structural revisions of 
article 20 of the Berne Convention. . . . The prospective reach of article 20 will continue 
to hinder efforts to legislate positive access mechanisms in subsequent agreements.”). 
220 See Fometeu, supra note 103, at 43; Okediji, supra note 77, at 29; Silva, supra 
note 59, at 622–23, 626–29 (all making these or similar suggestions). 
221 Silva, supra note 59, at 614. 




Annette Kur and others propose, for example, that Article 7 
“Objectives” should include a reference to “the larger public interest . . . 
in education.”223 Better yet would be an explicit reference here to all those 
human rights, including education, relevant in the TRIPS context.224 The 
authors propose a new Article 8a, seeking “a fair balance between private 
economic interests and the larger public interest as well as the interests of 
third parties”225 and setting out a more empowering version of the three-
step test for IP law, which puts the stress on what is now the third leg of 
the test and proceeds on the premise that users may use protected subject 
matter provided this “does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the right holder.”226 
According to the authors, Article 13 on L&Es in copyright law should 
provide for a mandatory L&E with respect to “use made for the purpose 
of . . . illustration for teaching . . . to the extent that this is necessary for 
[that] . . . purpose” (optional in Berne),227 a mandatory L&E with respect 
to “acts of reproduction made by publicly accessible libraries, educational 
establishments, . . . which are necessary for these institutions to perform 
their tasks” (missing in Berne),228 and an open clause permitting other 
enacted restrictions of copyright subject to the (redrafted) Articles 7 to 8b 
(also missing in Berne).229 The latter clause was to serve as a reminder 
that countries were entitled, even expected, to adopt “more detailed and 
far-reaching limitations” than those in a mandatory catalogue—as long as 
 
222 Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss argue that, in so far as a modification of 
TRIPS is unrealistic, relevant actors should rather direct their endeavors at compiling 
“an international intellectual property ‘acquis’—a set of basic principles that form the 
background norms animating the intellectual property system.” Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
& Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, An International Acquis: Integrating Regimes and Restoring 
Balance, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 121, 122 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2015). These meta-norms 
would provide the matrix for (re)achieving balance in global IP law. In this author’s view, 
such an acquis certainly makes sense for its clear practical usefulness, irrespective of 
whether TRIPS is actually modified or not. The fact just is that states are obliged under 
IHRL to “reform” TRIPS. “Reform” is a broad term and may cover different (or 
multiple) courses of action. 
223 ANNETTE KUR & MARIANNE LEVIN EDS., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR 
WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF TRIPS 463–64 (Art. 7(a)(i)) 
(2011). 
224 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has urged that “[i]n the event of a 
renegotiation of the Agreement . . . [there should be] . . . an express reference to human 
rights in article 7.” U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights [UNHCHR], The Impact of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human 
Rights: Rep. of the High Commissioner, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) [hereinafter 
UNHCHR, The Impact of TRIPS on Human Rights]. 
225 KUR & LEVIN, supra note 223, at 465 (Art. 8a(1)). 
226 Id. at 465–66 (Art. 8a(2)). 
227 Id. at 470–71 (Art. 13(1)(c)(ii)), 559–60. 
228 Id. at 470–71 (Art. 13(1)(d)), 562–63. As for the library L&E, “[m]embers may make 
reproduction dependent on payment of fair remuneration to the right holders.” Id. 
229 Id. at 472 (Art. 13(3)), 565. 




they were compatible with the more generous three-step test proposed.230 
8. Facilitate: It has been stated above that the right to education has 
traits of the right to development.231 It is vital that international IP law be 
designed in such a way as to allow each country to utilize whatever 
“policy space” it needs to address development objectives.232 Especially 
in developing countries, L&Es will be necessary that can facilitate bulk 
access to textbooks. Explicitly worded L&Es for educational institutions 
that countries may rely on to achieve such access may have to be made 
available in “the TRIPS context.” The civil society draft Access to 
Knowledge Treaty of 2005 proposes as L&Es, on the one hand, the free 
use by educational institutions of works as secondary readings for 
enrolled students;233 on the other, their use of works as primary 
instructional materials in return for equitable remuneration, if these 
materials are not made readily available by right holders at a reasonable 
price.234 In a sense, these provisions seek to liberalize the Berne Appendix 
at the level of “ordinary” L&Es.235 
Quite generally, “remuneration-based L&Es” (also termed “statutory 
licenses”) are a potent device in facilitating access.236 In instances where 
access would ordinarily affect the typical market for a product (as in the 
case of bulk usage of primary teaching materials), far-reaching 
entitlements to use, without consent, conferred by legislation could yet be 
considered legitimate if important welfare interests in a state are at stake 
and if such permission is subject to fair remuneration being paid. Such 
remuneration could be paid by the state directly rather than by educational 
institutions, as the latter, especially in developing countries, should not be 
intimidated or burdened negotiating modalities of use or remuneration 
with publishers or collecting societies. The overall arrangement might be 
what Ruth Okediji has in mind where she, in more or less the same breath, 
refers to access to knowledge in developing states, “newly designed (or 
 
230 Id. at 565. More extensive yet would be an (additional) international fair use clause. 
On “fair use,” see infra Section VII(D)(15), notes 297–304 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra Section V, first paragraph. 
232 See, e.g., Ahmed Abdel-Latif, The Right to Development: What Implications for the 
Multilateral Intellectual Property Framework?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 605, 614 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) (making 
this claim and ultimately grounding it in the right to development). See also Peter 
Drahos, “IP World”: Made by TNC Inc., in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 197, 198–202 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 
2010) (concisely and vividly explaining the fact that, from an economic perspective, the 
strength of IP protection will have to differ for each country in accordance with the 
individual development needs of that country, if social welfare is to be optimally 
promoted). 
233 Treaty on Access to Knowledge, Art. 3-1(a)(iii), Draft, May 10, 2005, 
www.keionline.org/book/proposalfortreatyofaccesstoknowledgemay102005draft. 
234 Id. Art. 3-1(a)(iv). 
235 DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 15, at 295. 
236 Christophe Geiger refers to statutory licenses as “limitation-based remuneration 
rights,” this term aptly describing what the nature of these licenses is. Christophe Geiger, 
Statutory Licenses as Enabler of Creative Uses, in REMUNERATION OF COPYRIGHT 
OWNERS: REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF NEW BUSINESS MODELS 305, 305 (Kung-
Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2017). 
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broadly applied) copyright L&Es,” and “compensation schemes for 
producers of educational materials.”237 Where in such circumstances of 
public urgency no such market would be affected (as broadly in the case 
of secondary teaching materials), there is no reason not to grant far-
reaching entitlements to use for free. 
Uma Suthersanen argues that in many developing countries, neither 
educational institutions nor students have the financial means to purchase 
primary or secondary teaching materials. Therefore, from the perspective 
of the copyright holder, there was no lost market opportunity in the case 
of unauthorized use.238 There is truth in this, of course. It implies, on the 
one hand, that, in many a developing country, “a reasonable price” for 
“primary instructional materials” may be “no” or a very low price, and, 
on the other, that remuneration (if any) would have to reflect the fact that 
the market opportunity lost is negligible. 
Consequently, as an adjunct to the obligation in Point 7, the right to 
education—specifically conceived as a right to development—requires 
that WTO members should initiate, promote, and help realize a reform 
of TRIPS that permits recourse to L&Es that can facilitate a bulk 
provision of textbooks in educational institutions. 
C.   The World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Trade 
Organization, Treaty Interpretation, Development Aid, and Technical 
Assistance 
9. Facilitate: WIPO members should initiate, promote, and help 
implement processes and, where necessary, reforms, that enhance 
conformity between WIPO structures and agendas and IHRL, the latter, 
of course, guaranteeing the right to education and the right to 
development. Previously, WIPO had been criticized for firmly advocating 
stronger IP protection in developing countries without paying attention to 
the potential adverse consequences of such protection.239 WIPO’s 
objectives, in terms of its founding document, do not include a 
development objective.240 Therefore, at the initiative of essentially 
developing states, WIPO adopted the WIPO Development Agenda in 
2007, a policy framework to ensure its activities take into account the 
special needs of developing countries.241 
 
237 Okediji, supra note 49, at 487. 
238 Uma Suthersanen, Education, IPRs and Fundamental Freedoms: The Right to 
Knowledge 12 (UNCTAD/ICTSD/BA Regional Arab Dialogue, Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs), Innovation, and Sustainable Development, Alexandria, Egypt, June 26–
28, 2005), paper on file with the author. See also Nicole M. Thomas, An Education: The 
Three-Step Test for Development, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 244, 257–58 (2012). 
239 See COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 20, at 157–59 
(articulating this criticism). 
240 See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, Arts. 3, 4, 
July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 26, 1970), and amended Sept. 28, 
1979 (referring only to the objective of the protection of IP). 
241 For some detail on the WIPO Development Agenda, see, e.g., Abdel-Latif, supra 
note 232, at 619–25. 




The Agenda’s 45 Recommendations emphasize the importance of a 
robust public domain,242 access to knowledge for developing states,243 and 
norm-setting activities related to L&Es by WIPO backing development 
goals.244 The Development Agenda may potentially become a suitable 
basis for strengthening the public interest in international IP law.245 It is 
the actual implementation of the recommendations that will determine 
whether the Development Agenda effectively contributes to access to 
knowledge246 and other Agenda goals. WIPO is busy examining questions 
regarding two possible international instruments on L&Es for education 
and libraries.247 It has been observed that these relate to “longstanding 
proposals . . . [that] . . . languish despite years of discussion.”248 
Irritatingly, the 45 Recommendations do not refer to human rights. It has 
thus rightly been urged that the Agenda document should be interpreted 
“so as to insert human rights norms into the conversation.”249 After all, it 
does appear desirable that WIPO’s founding document be amended in a 
way that demonstrates accountability for achieving balance in global IP 
rights protection.250 It must be understood that actual changes and 
concrete results in WIPO are not a matter of courtesy toward developing 
countries, but required by ETOs under IHRL. 
10. Facilitate: WTO members should initiate, promote, and help 
implement processes, and, where necessary, reforms, that enhance 
conformity between WTO structures and agendas and IHRL, the latter 
guaranteeing the right to education and the right to development. It is 
widely agreed that the WTO reveals a development deficit.251 Sonia 
Rolland in her book Development at the World Trade Organization says 
 
242 WIPO, The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda, 
Recomms. 16, 20 (2007), https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf. 
243 Id. Recomm. 19. 
244 Id. Recomm. 22(d). Specifically highlighting WIPO’s potential role under the 
Development Agenda with regard to norm-setting activities related to L&Es to facilitate 
access to textbooks in developing states, see ISIKO ŠTRBA, supra note 3, at 179–200. 
245 See CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: 
RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 76–82 (2007) (broadly arguing that the 
Development Agenda will help WIPO socialize international IP law). 
246 Ahmed Abdel-Latif, The Emergence of the A2K Movement: Reminiscences and 
Reflections of a Developing-Country Delegate, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 232, at 99, 119–20. 
247 In this regard, see also infra note 305 and generally Section VII(D)(15). 
248 Okediji, supra note 52, at 15–16. 
249 Amanda Barratt, The Curious Absence of Human Rights: Can the WIPO Development 
Agenda Transform Intellectual Property Negotiation?, 14 L., DEMOCRACY & DEV. 14, 
45 (2010). 
250 Already the 2002 Report of the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights had 
recognized that this might be necessary if a reinterpretation of the WIPO articles in favor 
of balance fails. COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2002 Report, supra note 20, at 159. 
251 See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights [UNHCHR], Mainstreaming the 
Right to Development into International Trade Law and Policy at the World Trade 
Organization: Rep. of the High Commissioner (prep. by Robert Howse), Sub-Comm’n 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17 (June 9, 2004) (“Understood in terms of the right to 
development, many of the [WTO] meta-structures leave much to be desired.”) 
[hereinafter UNHCHR, The Right to Development at the WTO]. 
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that the WTO “has been largely deaf to legal arguments grounded in any 
claim or right to development.”252 Hence, in TRIPS, there are no 
substantive provisions relating to “special and differential treatment” 
benefiting developing countries.253 There are no “general exceptions” 
protecting the public interest, but only “limited exceptions.”254 There are 
mandatory provisions protecting IP right holders, but only best endeavor 
provisions befitting the public interest.255 TRIPS also does not define 
rights of users.256 Moreover, it sets out the content of IP rights in 
considerable detail, but only alludes to the responsibilities of IP right 
holders.257 
Regarding Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, it has been stated that they 
should function, amongst others, as a “sword,” or as “offensive tools,” to 
promote socio-economic welfare or development goals within the WTO-
TRIPS context.258 Relying on Articles 7 and 8 and ETOs under IHRL, the 
Council for TRIPS should thus support development on maximum 
standards, L&Es, and right holders’ obligations259—inter alia to ensure 
quality education for all and national development through education 
remain achievable goals. For example, concerning right holders’ 
responsibilities, Christophe Geiger proposes as a general guiding 
principle, a duty of right holders to disseminate as widely as possible 
protected works and to exploit them.260 As part of its monitoring mandate, 
the TRIPS Council should assess the impact of TRIPS rules and policies 
on development.261 It should also assess whether TRIPS, in fulfillment of 
Article 7, does actually lead to a dissemination and transfer of 
technological and other knowledge.262 In a report of 2004, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights correctly explains that trade under the 
 
252 SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION v (2012). 
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257 UNHCHR, The Impact of TRIPS on Human Rights, supra note 224, ¶ 23. 
258 Yu, supra note 205, at 1031, 1033. 
259 See id. at 1034–37 (making the argument, or a very similar argument, in light of 
Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS). 
260 Christophe Geiger, Copyright as an Access Right: Securing Cultural Participation 
through the Protection of Creators’ Interests, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE 
COPYRIGHT?, supra note 85, at 73, 93. 
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UNHCHR, The Right to Development at the WTO, supra note 251, ¶¶ 26–30; 
specifically addressing the WTO-TRIPS and WIPO context, see Yu, supra note 205, at 
1037–38. 
262 In favor of such assessments, see UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 132 (2005); Yu, supra note 205, at 1034–35. The TRIPS Council, in 
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developed WTO members with their technology transfer obligations under Article 66(2) 
of TRIPS. TRIPS, supra note 18, Art. 66(2); WTO, Decision of the Council for TRIPS 
of Feb. 19, 2003, Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/28 
(Feb. 20, 2003). For comments on the mechanism and its weaknesses, see Suerie Moon, 
Meaningful Technology Transfer to the LDCs: A Proposal for a Monitoring Mechanism 
for TRIPS Article 66.2 (ICTSD, Policy Brief No. 9, Apr. 2011). 




WTO should not only increase aggregate national wealth, but must also 
contribute to human opportunities for self-realization.263 It must thus also 
facilitate educational opportunity. In sum, WTO members bear 
responsibility for ensuring that the right to education, as normatively 
enhanced by the right to development, is mainstreamed into WTO 
structure and practice. 
11. Facilitate: WTO members should initiate, promote, and help 
adopt and implement safeguard policies (or at least promote a consistent 
practice) in terms of which the Council for TRIPS and WTO adjudicatory 
bodies are to interpret TRIPS law in conformity with WTO members’ 
obligations under IHRL. 
Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS play a seminal role in interpreting TRIPS. 
On the one hand, these provisions reflect the “object and purpose” of 
TRIPS. In terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 
“object and purpose” of a treaty constitutes one of the crucial 
considerations for purposes of interpreting an international agreement.264 
Express or implied references in Articles 7 and 8 to the transfer and 
dissemination of knowledge, the protection of the rights of users of 
copyrighted works, the enforcement of the duties of copyright holders, 
and the safeguarding of access to knowledge or textbooks, form part of 
the object and purpose of TRIPS. Accordingly, these aims, in an overall 
balancing of TRIPS aims, must guide the interpretation of especially 
broadly formulated provisions in TRIPS, for instance, Article 13 on the 
three-step test.265 
On the other hand, the Vienna Convention also requires treaty terms 
to be interpreted in their context. The context includes “[a]ny relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.”266 As Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan points out, Articles 7 and 8 
function as integration principles.267 They are a tool for integrating the 
objectives pursued by other international agreements.268 Similarly, Peter 
Yu explains that Articles 7 and 8 are “a useful bridge” that connects 
 
263 UNHCHR, The Right to Development at the WTO, supra note 251, at 2. 
264 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
265 Broadly in this sense, see HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, THE PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 13.28, 13.53 (2016) (Articles 7 
and 8 of TRIPS, reflecting the object and purpose of TRIPS, are to assist in the 
interpretation of broad and open treaty language). See also Susy Frankel, WTO 
Application of the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law to 
Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 397 (2006) (“if the overall object and 
purpose [of TRIPS] can be sidelined, then Articles 7 and 8 have no meaning”); Alison 
Slade, The Objectives and Principles of the WTO TRIPS Agreement: A Detailed 
Anatomy, 53 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 948, 951 (2016) (“Articles 7 and 8 . . . illuminat[e] 
the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement”); Yu, supra note 205, at 1020–22 
(Articles 7 and 8 as “object and purpose” of TRIPS, as “guiding light,” “important 
[especially] in light of the many ambiguities built into the TRIPS Agreement”). 
266 VCLT, supra note 264, Art. 31(3)(c). 
267 See GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, supra note 265, ¶¶ 13.03–58 (discussing Articles 7 and 8 
of TRIPS as “general principles for integration”) and ¶¶ 13.59–85 (discussing “20 years 
of neglect” of Articles 7 and 8 in WTO dispute settlement). 
268 Id. ¶ 13.44. 
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TRIPS with other regimes such as IHRL.269 This is facilitated by 
terminology in Articles 7 and 8 alluding to IHRL.270 In this way, the right 
to education in Article 13 of the ICESCR—not least in its developmental 
dimension (policy space for educational development)—becomes 
relevant to interpreting TRIPS. 
However, in the context of the present discussion, the notion of ETOs 
adds a novel aspect. The obligation of “systemic integration” flows no 
longer only from the rules of treaty interpretation, but may also be said to 
result from ETOs under IHRL. In the latter version of the obligation 
though, human rights claim priority.271 What would be the role of 
Articles 7 and 8 in this scheme? By reason of their human rights-friendly 
language, Articles 7 and 8 yet retain their facilitative role in this process 
of interpretation. 
12. Provide: Developed states that are in a position to do so, should, 
in accordance with the requests of developing states in need, make 
available funds to the latter as part of their ODA, to contribute toward the 
cost of remuneration rights of (foreign or global) copyright holders as 
referred to under Point 8 above,272 the cost of any compulsory licenses 
under the Berne Appendix, and the cost of (especially imported) 
textbooks generally. Funds should also go toward supporting the growth 
of a local publishing industry. For some countries, “most of the elements 
of an indigenous publishing industry are missing and there is a need to 
build it up from scratch.”273 
13. Provide: Developed states that are in a position to do so, should, 
in accordance with the requests of developing states in need, make 
available technical assistance to the latter, aiding them in setting up IP and 
copyright protection systems that satisfy the requirements of international 
IP and human rights law (for example, advising on L&Es for education 
that facilitate adequate access to textbooks). Relevant technical assistance 
should support local publishing. To a significant extent, the technical 
assistance obligation has become located in WIPO and the WTO. 
Article 67 of TRIPS, for example, provides that “developed country 
Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and 
conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing 
and least-developed country Members.”274 Any assistance rendered must 
itself observe international human rights standards. With regard to WIPO 
capacity building programs, it has been noted with dismay that the 
absence of assistance on flexibilities for developing countries is 
 
269 Yu, supra note 205, at 1039. 
270 See, e.g., id. at 1037 (“[T]he references to the ‘social and economic welfare’ and ‘a 
balance of rights and obligations’ in Article 7 provide a strong reminder of the many 
obligations imposed by the [ICESCR], such as the right[] to . . . education.”). 
271 In this regard, see further infra the parts of Section VIII on the “constitutionalization” 
of IP law and the aspect of human rights priority. 
272 See supra Section VII(B)(8). 
273 Altbach, supra note 21, at 23. 
274 TRIPS, supra note 18, Art. 67. Developed WTO members have agreed to report on 
these measures annually to the Council for TRIPS. 





D.   Three-Step Test, Limitations and Exceptions for Education, 
TRIPS Flexibilities, and Free Trade Agreements 
14. Facilitate: WIPO and WTO members should initiate, promote, 
and help adopt and implement a joint WIPO/WTO policy or soft law 
instrument calling for a balanced interpretation of the three-step test and 
providing doctrinal clarity and concrete guidelines on how to apply the 
test in a way that protects the interests of authors, users, and the wider 
public, and, generally, safeguards important human rights concerns.276 
This would be additional to any actual reformulation of the test in hard 
law (notably TRIPS).277 It has been noted that 
[v]arious alternative approaches have been developed in literature 
and applied by national courts, including an understanding of the 
three-step test as a refined proportionality test, the use of its 
abstract criteria as factors to be weighed in a global balancing 
exercise and a reverse reading of the test starting with the last, 
most flexible criterion.278 
 
The test should be understood holistically with an emphasis on the 
third leg. Conflict with the normal (economic) exploitation of a work (the 
subject of inquiry of the second leg) should be one, admittedly an 
important, consideration among many—these also including access to 
education—in assessing whether use unreasonably prejudices the 
legitimate interests of the right holder. Potential conflict may be 
“overridden” where vital economic, social, or cultural needs justify this, 
specifically if some form of remuneration is paid by someone. The first 
leg should treat use by others as a normal incidence of copyright, unless 
exclusion is legitimate. Ultimately, as Christophe Geiger highlights, there 
is an urgent need to re-establish copyright as an access right. There is 
the need to rethink copyright in order to adapt its rules to its 
initially dual character: 1) of a right to secure and organise cultural 
participation and access to creative works (access aspect); and 
2) of a guarantee that the creator participates fairly in the fruit of 
the commercial exploitation of his [or her] works (protection 
 
275 Silva, supra note 59, at 629. 
276 In this regard, the Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test in 
Copyright Law of 2008, formulated by international copyright law experts (see Geiger 
et al., Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law, 
supra note 48), may serve as a tentative blueprint. Its recourse to human rights is, 
however, rather sparse. Christophe Geiger proposes that “this initiative should now be 
taken one step further and that a legal instrument should be integrated into international 
law.” Christophe Geiger, Implementing an International Instrument for Interpreting 
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, 6 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 
627, 628 (2009). 
277 In this regard, see the discussion supra in Section VII(B)(7). 
278 Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais & Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step Test 
Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 581, 626 (2014). 





Accepting the ETO to create and read international IP law in 
accordance with human rights, it will be readily apparent that the three-
step test must perfectly mirror the demands of human rights. Or, stated 
differently: the three-step test must permit any such use as constitutes an 
entitlement under human rights. Naturally, a solution that is legitimate in 
a developing country need not be so in an industrialized country. 
15. Facilitate: There needs to be clarity on which L&Es for education 
are permissible, which are to be mandatory, and what their respective 
scope should be, to adequately protect the right to education. This might 
be addressed as part of revising, or re-enacting, Berne280 and/or TRIPS.281 
Increasingly, however, there are calls for a separate international 
instrument on L&Es,282 or even specific instruments on L&Es for 
education and libraries. The former U.N. Special Rapporteur in the Field 
of Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed, recommends that 
WIPO members should support the adoption of international 
instruments on copyright exceptions and limitations for libraries 
and education. The possibility of establishing a core list of 
minimum required exceptions and limitations incorporating those 
currently recognised by most States, and/or an international fair 
use provision, should also be explored.283 
 
Yet others propose recourse to “an international intellectual property 
‘acquis,’”284 which, in a sense, refers to something like a “document” of 
basic, “best,” or “proven” principles, and which could also address L&Es 
for education. 
There need to be robust personal or private use, teaching and 
education, library and literacy, and translation L&Es (potentially 
remuneration-based in certain cases). In practice, learning-related 
personal or private use appears not so much of a problem. For the United 
States, for example, it has been noted with regard to learning-related use, 
that there are few litigated cases, and that “uses are certainly not fair 
across the board, but many are likely fair; still others have become so 
customary and so widely tolerated for so long as effectively to be outside 
 
279 Geiger, supra note 260, at 75. 
280 Daniel Gervais argues that, because it is unrealistic to achieve the unanimity required 
to revise the substantive part of Berne (Berne Convention, supra note 19, Art. 27(3)), 
there should rather be “a new Act of the Convention.” GERVAIS, supra note 35, at 295. 
Further, “[t]he best way to ‘impose’ exceptions and limitations is not . . . to have a series 
of sector-specific treaties on exceptions and limitations.” Id. at 296. Gervais’s book 
presents a blueprint for such a new act. 
281 For a blueprint of proposed “amendments” to TRIPS, see notably KUR & LEVIN, 
supra note 223. 
282 For a blueprint in this regard, see notably Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 46. 
283 Shaheed, supra note 63, ¶ 109. 
284 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 222, at 122. On this suggestion, see supra 
note 222. 





As for the current teaching L&E, this should mature into a 
comprehensive education L&E benefiting non-commercial educational 
institutions. It must cater for utilizing the whole of a work in appropriate 
circumstances.286 Interestingly, Margaret Chon has suggested with regard 
to Article 10(2) of the Berne Convention that developing states should, 
based on a principle of substantive equality, fully exhaust that provision’s 
potential “to create access to works for educational purposes that may 
counterbalance [a] lack of bulk access to textbooks.”287 This is possible, 
but requires the necessary courage to go against the grain of established 
copyright wisdom. In India, the High Court of Delhi delivered a 
remarkable judgment in 2016 in a case in which three well-known 
international academic publishers had sued the University of Delhi 
because it had copied from the plaintiffs’ publications “on a large scale,” 
circulating unauthorized course packs containing “substantial extracts” 
from the plaintiffs’ publications.288 However, the Court decided in favor 
of Delhi University. It held that “teaching” in the Indian teaching L&E 
covered not only the actual lecture, but also setting the syllabus, 
prescribing textbooks, and all reading students were required to do pre 
and post lecture.289 The Court explained: 
Copyright, specially in literary works, is thus not an inevitable, 
divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute 
ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate 
activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of 
the public. Copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the 
harvest of knowledge.290 
 
The Court further argued that its interpretation complied with the 
Berne Convention and TRIPS.291 In this regard, reference may be made 
to Point 8 above, where it was stated that some form of remuneration by, 
for example, the state may be apposite in instances of particularly wide 
usage of primary instructional materials (typical textbooks).292 The 
education L&E must cover reproduction right, translation right, and 
adaptation right—perhaps even the right of communication to the 
public.293 It must permit utilization in distance education.294 Library and 
literacy L&Es should, likewise, facilitate bulk provision to serve wider, 
 
285 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2587 (2009). 
286 CONSUMERS INT’L, COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE: POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON FLEXIBILITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAWS 29 (Asia Pacific Office, 
2006) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS]. 
287 Chon, supra note 15, at 837–39, citation at 838. 
288 Univ. of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, Delhi High Ct., CS(OS) 
2439/2012, ¶ 1 (Sept. 16, 2016) (India). 
289 Id. ¶ 72. 
290 Id. ¶ 80. 
291 Id. ¶¶ 91–100. Approvingly discussing this case, see also Okediji, supra note 52, at 
54–57. 
292 See supra Section VII(B)(8). 
293 COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS, supra note 286, at 30. 
294 Id. 
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also informal, education needs in appropriate circumstances. 
It has sensibly been suggested that there should be “local language 
limitations,” generally—that is, also beyond the educational context—
permitting translations into neglected local languages.295 There should 
further be a general provision in terms of which exclusive translation 
rights regarding a work terminate for a specific language in a country, if, 
let’s say, three or five years after first publication, the work has not been 
made available in that language in the country concerned.296 
Moreover, a fair use provision makes sense. “Fair use” means a broad 
open clause exemption to copyright protection, covering uses that may be 
considered “fair.” Whether use is fair is adjudged on a case by case basis 
(ultimately by the courts) in light of the purpose of the use, the nature of 
the work, the extent of use, the potential market affected, and so on.297 
Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi say of fair use that it is “a bold 
demonstration of the need to share culture in order to get more of it.”298 
A fair use provision in national legislation should benefit access to 
knowledge protected by copyright.299 Elements of “fair use” could be 
combined with those of “fair dealing” (“fair dealing” enumerating more 
narrowly what may be considered “fair” forms of use) to facilitate access 
to copyrighted materials for purposes of education.300 With regard to fair 
use, it has thus been suggested that courts should perhaps presume 
educational use to be fair.301 Where use does not fall within the scope of 
specific provisions but fulfils the requirements of the general provision, 
such use would be allowed, even though national legislation did not 
specifically contemplate such use, to benefit access to copyright-protected 
knowledge.302 A prominent writer has argued in favor of an international 
fair use doctrine unfettered by the three-step test.303 Fair use, by reason of 
its generality, has a strained relationship with the three-step test.304 
 
295 Ncube, supra note 85, at 275–76. Similarly, see Basalamah, supra note 109, at 535 
(arguing that translations into the languages of least developed countries should be 
covered by fair use, because no significant markets are lost to publishers and because of 
“the need for books in the third world”). 
296 See also Ncube, supra note 85, at 274–75; Silva, supra note 59, at 585–86, 624–25 
(making similar suggestions). 
297 For a comprehensive discussion of the fair use doctrine as applicable in the U.S., see 
PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE 
BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 2018). 
298 Id. at 18. 
299See COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS, supra note 286, at 27–28 (making this 
recommendation). 
300 See ISIKO ŠTRBA, supra note 3, at 111–57, 163–64 (making this recommendation). 
301 Samuelson, supra note 285, at 2587. 
302 COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS, supra note 286, at 27–28. 
303 See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (2000). Such a doctrine (or clause) goes beyond an international open 
clause permitting additional, nationally enacted, specified forms of dealing with a 
protected work subject to the three-step test, as alluded to supra in Section VII(B)(7). It 
should be appreciated that both options could apply cumulatively. 
304 Ruth Okediji argues that a U.S.-style fair use clause would be too indeterminate, too 
broad, and that it would nullify and impair benefits reasonably accruing under TRIPS 
 




However, fair use would survive scrutiny under the test in its 
“compassionate,” human rights-aligned version as referred to under the 
previous point. 
Altogether, the relevant ETO for this point might be formulated as 
follows: WIPO and WTO members should initiate, promote, and help 
adopt and implement an exposition of L&Es for education—as part of a 
revised, or re-enacted, Berne and/or TRIPS Agreement, and/or in a 
separate, soft or hard law general or cluster, or “basic (best) principles,” 
international document—that adequately protects access to educational 
materials as part of the right to education.305 
16. Facilitate: WTO members should initiate, promote, and help 
adopt and implement a policy or soft law instrument on TRIPS and 
educational materials (akin to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, adopted at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in 2001) that encourages developing states to fully utilize the 
flexibilities provided for under TRIPS, notably compulsory licenses and 
parallel imports, to protect the right to education.306 
Though the use of compulsory licenses307 in the field of copyright 
 
(WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Art. 26), so as not to survive scrutiny under 
the three-step test of Berne or TRIPS. Id. at 117–21. See, however, SENFTLEBEN, supra 
note 34, at 162–68 (arguing that a qualitative approach to the first leg of the three-step 
test (“certain special cases”) does not require L&Es to be “exact and precise,” but merely 
“distinguishable from each other”—for that reason, they need not necessarily be 
“enacted,” but can also be discerned by a court). 
305 In favor of a soft law modality (at any rate for now), see, e.g., Hugenholtz & Okediji, 
supra note 46, at 49; ISIKO ŠTRBA, supra note 3, at 198–200. WIPO’s Standing 
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights is at the moment examining questions 
regarding two possible international instruments on L&Es for educational activities and 
libraries. Studies have been submitted capturing L&Es used by WIPO members and 
attempting to provide typologies of the L&Es used (also identifying “elements for 
ongoing consideration”): Daniel Seng, Updated Study and Additional Analysis of Study 
on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Educational Activities, World Intellectual 
Property Organization [WIPO], Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related Rights, 
SCCR/35/5 Rev. (Nov. 10, 2017); Crews, L&Es for Libraries and Archives, supra 
note 69; Daniel Seng, Educational Activities Copyright Exceptions: Typology Analysis, 
WIPO, Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related Rights, SCCR/38/8 (Mar. 29, 2019); 
Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries: Typology 
Analysis, WIPO, Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related Rights, SCCR/38/4 
(Mar. 29, 2019). For further relevant information, visit the website of the Standing 
Comm. at https://www.wipo.int/policy/en/sccr. 
306 See, e.g., Staudinger, supra note 15 (making this suggestion). By way of analogy to 
the Doha Declaration, it should be possible to import and export textbooks published 
under a compulsory license where there are no publication capacities or the relevant 
book market is too small in a country. 
307 “Compulsory licenses” grant IP entitlements to a certain party without the consent of 
the IP right holder, (typically) subject to the former paying fair remuneration to the latter, 
and are granted by a government, following application to a designated national agency 
by the interested party. Various reasons of public interest may justify the granting of such 
licenses. Article 31 of TRIPS, regulating compulsory licenses in the sphere of patents, 
mentions as possible reasons a national emergency, other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, public non-commercial use, or remedying anticompetitive practices. TRIPS, 
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beyond the Berne Appendix is not expressly dealt with in TRIPS, 
developing states are not prohibited from using compulsory licenses 
beyond the Berne Appendix.308 This must be considered especially true 
for as long as the Appendix is dysfunctional. A national body might grant 
licenses in cases of an abuse of copyright (for example, anticompetitive 
conduct involving the charging of excessive prices for specific textbooks, 
unreasonably refusing a translation or reproduction license, or offering it 
for an unreasonable fee or on other unreasonable terms) or situations of 
serious undersupply of textbooks, where granting such licenses would be 
in the public interest.309 Melissa Staudinger considers a lack of education 
in a country to constitute a circumstance of extreme urgency, justifying 
compulsory licenses for the reproduction and distribution of textbooks.310 
A weighty argument in support of compulsory licenses in this type of case 
lies in a purposive interpretation of Article 9(2) of TRIPS. In terms of that 
provision, copyright protection extends to expressions, but not ideas.311 
This implies that in contexts of extreme textbook scarcity, where the 
expression becomes the idea, reproduction (or also translation) without 
consent (against fair remuneration) should be permissible to satisfy acute 
educational needs, as otherwise copyright protection would effectively 
prevent the spread of ideas.312 In case of default on the part of national 
agencies, it should be possible, in certain cases, to approach an 
international body—for instance, WIPO—for a compulsory license.313 
 
supra note 18, Art. 31(b), (k). Usually, right holders must first be approached for 
consent. Id. Art. 31(b). Licenses must usually also be granted predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market. Id. Art. 31(f). 
308 See, e.g., ISIKO ŠTRBA, supra note 3, at 157–64 (arguing that the use of compulsory 
licenses beyond the Berne Appendix is something developing countries could explore); 
Okediji, supra note 77, at 18 (holding that, as the Berne Convention provides for 
equitable remuneration schemes in certain areas, it also does not rule out compulsory 
licenses). 
309 See Chris Armstrong et al., Summary and Conclusions, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN 
AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 102, at 317, 344 (a national copyright 
tribunal could be awarded the power to grant compulsory licenses). Under TRIPS, 
compulsory licenses granted pursuant to considerations of public policy beyond 
copyright law, specifically those of competition law, arguably are not subject to scrutiny 
under the three-step test. Okediji, supra note 77, at 14. In as far as competition law-based 
compulsory licenses are concerned—at any rate, this is the case in the field of patents—
WTO members may provide that right holders need not be approached for consent, 
licenses need not be granted predominantly for the supply of the domestic market, and 
the award of a license may entail reduced remuneration to correct anticompetitive 
practices. TRIPS, supra note 18, Art. 31(k), (b), (f). 
310 Staudinger, supra note 15, at 358. 
311 TRIPS, supra note 18, Art. 9(2). 
312 See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 358–61 (explaining that copyright does not, 
and should not, grant an absolute monopoly). 
313 See Silva, supra note 59, at 623 (“An effective solution must allow [language and 
culture] minority members to apply for compulsory licenses directly to an international 
organization in order to bypass the limitations or negligence of their government.”). The 
installation of a mechanism of recourse to an international body might require changes 
to the Berne Convention and/or TRIPS Agreement. 




As for parallel imports,314 developing states should enact international 
exhaustion rules that would facilitate parallel imports of cheaper 
copyright-based educational materials, for example copies that pass 
muster under the provisions on fair use in other countries.315 Developed 
states are likely to exert pressure on developing states to enact national 
exhaustion rules that safeguard the exclusive right of IP right holders to 
import and sell, or otherwise distribute, articles based on their IP right 
produced and sold abroad. The effect of Article 6 of TRIPS, however, is 
to leave it to WTO members to choose either regime of exhaustion for any 
field of IP law.316 Developing states can, therefore, not be forbidden to 
opt for a regime in terms of which copyright entitlements are exhausted 
once textbooks have been produced and sold in another country, thus 
permitting parallel imports of such textbooks. 
17. Facilitate: WTO members should elaborate, interpret, and apply 
FTAs regulating copyright in a manner consistent with their international 
human rights obligations. Prior and subsequent to their conclusion, WTO 
members should subject FTAs to human rights impact assessments, also 
with respect to their extraterritorial effects. These days, many FTAs 
provide for levels of IP protection exceeding those envisaged under 
TRIPS. In so doing, they may pose a threat to the right to education and 
other human rights. By way of example, Morocco has concluded an FTA 
with the United States containing TRIPS-plus provisions.317 The term of 
copyright protection is seventy rather than fifty years, (unauthorized) 
parallel imports are not allowed, and more precise standards forbidding 
the circumvention of TPMs (digital works) are stipulated.318 It has been 
observed that 
Morocco has thus relinquished its right to use many of the 
copyright flexibilities granted to countries by the WTO. . . . The 
challenges connected to the US-Morocco FTA are numerous. In 
the field of knowledge/learning materials, Morocco’s public 
education system is already fragile and sensitive to the price of 
foreign publications. The strengthening of copyright included in 
the agreement may, among other things, restrict access to these 
publications.319 
 
The trade ministries of developing states, also because of a reluctance 
 
314 “Parallel imports” entail the importation of IP right-based products, subsequent to 
their production and sale by the IP right holder, or a licensee, in one country, into another 
country, in order to sell or otherwise distribute them in that country, without the consent 
of the IP right holder. 
315 See Chon, supra note 15, at 839 (making this suggestion). 
316 In other words, WTO members may either endorse the doctrine of international 
exhaustion of IP rights (that would allow parallel imports) or that of national exhaustion 
of IP rights (that would not allow them). TRIPS, supra note 18, Art. 6. 
317 U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 
(2005) (entered into force Jan. 1, 2006). 
318 Id. Arts. 15.5.5, 15.5.2, 15.5.8. 
319 Saïd Aghrib, Noufissa El Moujaddidi & Abdelmalek El Ouazzani, Morocco, in 
ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 102, at 126, 
145. 
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to understand the full impact of IP rights, are willing to use these rights as 
“bargaining chips” to get market access in rich countries,320 making it 
easy for the latter to secure maximalist IP protection in FTAs. Once an 
FTA is in place, however, it is “a hard fact of life” and very difficult to 
reverse. In this sense, FTAs are “new constitutionalism” devices,321 
seeking to globally enshrine property protection at the cost of access, 
freedom, socio-economic welfare, dignity, and equality. Many FTAs, by 
limiting recourse to TRIPS flexibilities, erode the policy space that is 
provided on the multilateral level.322 They compel countries to divert 
scarce resources and attention away from important international 
intergovernmental initiatives, such as notably the development of the 
international human rights system.323 They further lead to a fragmentation 
of the international regulatory system (the famous “spaghetti bowl”), with 
powerful states promoting such fragmentation to create “strategic 
inconsistencies” and putting pressure on what they consider unfavorable 
norms in the international human rights system.324 Consequently, many 
FTAs undermine human rights, including those to education and 
development. 
However, as a result of obligations within and outside international IP 
law, “TRIPS . . . does not only create a ‘floor’ of minimum protection, but 
opens the door to ceilings which place a binding maximum level [on] the 
protection of IP.”325 It has been urged that Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS 
should inspire models on which to base international negotiations for the 
conclusion of FTAs.326 This should be supported. However, states 
additionally bear ETOs under IHRL in this context. These similarly 
confirm ceilings and require the installation of access-preserving 
protective mechanisms. 
In sum, FTAs should never impose limitations on utilizing flexibilities 
available under TRIPS that could be relied on to safeguard access to 
educational materials. L&Es for education may not be eroded. The three-
 
320 See Antoni Verger & Barbara van Paassen, Human Development vis-á-vis Free Trade: 
Understanding Developing Countries’ Positions in Trade Negotiations on Education and 
Intellectual Property Rights, 20 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 712, 735 (2013) (making this 
finding based on extensive primary empirical data). 
321 See, e.g., Stephen Gill, New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political 
Economy, 10 PACIFICA REV. 23 (1998) (describing how international trade and finance 
law arrangements are being put in place as global constitutional devices to “lock in” 
neoliberal reforms). 
322 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation between TRIPS and 
Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS 
Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 364 (2011). 
323 Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1089 (2012). 
324 Id. at 1090–91. 
325 Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough Is Enough: The Notion of 
Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection 68 (Max Planck Inst. 
for Innov. & Competition, Research Paper Series No. 09-01, 2008) (footnote omitted), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1326429. 
326 Yu, supra note 205, at 1027 (making this proposition, arguing that Articles 7 and 8 of 
TRIPS should serve “as a response to the growing use of ‘TRIPS-plus’ bilateral and 
regional trade agreements”). 




step test must find its most empowering application. Infringements of 
copyright not occurring on a commercial scale should not be 
criminalized.327 Where necessary, provisions in FTAs need to be modified 
or deleted, appropriate safeguard clauses be included, or agreements as a 
whole be terminated. 
E.   Reporting Obligations, Obligations of Conduct and Result, and 
Questioning Copyright as such 
18. Facilitate: At the moment, TRIPS countries are only required to 
report on their compliance with IP protection prescribed by TRIPS to the 
Council for TRIPS.328 ETOs under the right to education, and other 
economic, social, and cultural rights, entail that WTO members should 
establish a formal reporting mechanism, requiring TRIPS countries, in 
regular intervals, to report on their use of L&Es and flexibilities, available 
under TRIPS, to safeguard the development goals of Articles 7 and 8 of 
TRIPS (also access to knowledge or textbooks), as normatively enhanced 
by IHRL (including the right to education and the right to development), 
for consideration by the TRIPS Council.329 Similar reporting mechanisms 
which oblige states to report on successes and failures toward compliance 
with human rights exist under the various U.N. human rights treaties. The 
TRIPS Council should adopt recommendations, advising members on 
how to optimally utilize the policy space available under TRIPS to protect 
development, including in the sphere of education. Such a reporting 
mechanism finds support also in the following consideration: It has been 
stated above that Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS should be used as a “sword,” 
in the sense that they should become “offensive tools” in pursuing socio-
economic welfare and development goals within the WTO-TRIPS 
context.330 The TRIPS Council should thus use them to promote 
development on L&Es and flexibilities.331 Such development might well 
yield a conception in terms of which applying appropriate L&Es and 
flexibilities will in many cases be more of a duty than only a right. A 
reliance on IHRL would confirm such a conclusion. 
19. Facilitate: Altogether, IHRL, therefore, gives rise to various 
ETOs to respect, protect, and fulfill (facilitate and provide) the right to 
education in the Berne, TRIPS, and FTA context, directed at safeguarding 
access to textbooks. At the level of fulfilling rights, the duty to facilitate 
 
327 See, e.g., Ramcharan, supra note 15, at 69 (“[Such criminalization] in particular 
heralds dramatically a loss of balance in the copyright regime as there is no moral 
consensus on the same.”). 
328 TRIPS, supra note 18, Art. 63(2) (“Members shall notify the[ir] laws and regulations 
. . . to the Council for TRIPS”) read with Art. 68. Formalized reporting procedures do, 
however, exist with respect to the technology transfer and technical cooperation 
obligations which developed WTO members assume in terms of Articles 66(2) and 67 
of TRIPS, respectively. In this regard, see supra notes 262 & 274 and accompanying 
text, respectively. 
329 See also Okediji, supra note 52, at 64–65 (likewise recommending such a reporting 
mechanism). 
330 Yu, supra note 205, at 1031, 1033. 
331 Id. at 1034–35. See also supra Section VII(C)(10) on this point. 
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is prominent in the present perspective. These duties are intriguing and 
complex. In the above examples, they are, to use the International Law 
Commission’s well-known distinction between obligations of conduct 
and result,332 obligations of conduct linked to a broader obligation of 
result. The latter prescribes the result to be achieved: States should create 
an international enabling environment conducive to the universal 
fulfillment of the right of access to textbooks. The former prescribe, with 
varying degrees of urgency, the specific type of conduct to be followed, 
as elucidated above.333 
Thus, for example, a reform of the Berne Appendix (or equivalent 
conduct) may be considered “prescribed” conduct. Achievement of the 
result—conditions facilitating access to textbooks—may, in general, of 
course, also be advanced through other forms of conduct not specifically 
prescribed as described above. That these are not specifically prescribed 
does not mean that meaningful other measures, whatever they would be, 
must not also be taken. To identify possible measures, thinking outside 
the box is desirable. Hence, one may think of the constitutive registration 
of copyright.334 This would eliminate the problem of orphan works. Such 
works would be in the public domain for free use in schools and 
universities. Likewise, one may see the typical textbook for what it is, an 
instrumentality to achieve certain learning outcomes, rather than a work 
of great originality.335 Consequently, copyright protection for such works 
might well be restricted to, let’s say, three years. During that period, the 
publisher can materialize the larger share of anticipated profits, while, 
after this period, books would not yet be out of date. However, would this 
maintain the incentive of (private) publishers to produce textbooks? State 
subsidies to, or tax relief for, publishers are conceivable measures to 
maintain this. The right to education, per definition, requires the state to 
realize—that is, to pay for—the education system. In any event, the state 
should assume a more prominent role in textbook production and, 
wherever possible, retain copyright. 
In sum, therefore, beyond specific conduct identified as mandatory in 
 
332 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work 
of Its Twenty-Ninth Session, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/32/10 
(1977), reprinted in [1977] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 11–30, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1977/Add.l (Part 2) (elaborating on the distinction between obligations 
of conduct and result; broadly, obligations of conduct expect states to undertake a 
specific course of conduct; obligations of result expect states to achieve a particular 
result through conduct, the nature of, and the means required for which, are left to state 
discretion). 
333 See Section VII, Points 4–11, 14–18 (and 19–20). 
334 See, e.g., Dev S. Gangjee, Copyright Formalities: A Return to Registration?, in WHAT 
IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT?, supra note 85, at 213. 
335 Very sensibly, Christophe Geiger proposes that traditionally rather lax tests for 
assessing whether copyright protection should arise with regard to a specific work, be 
replaced with a more onerous test: “Only expressions that are the result of a creational 
process in which the freedom of the creator has been superior to imposed necessities and 
which neither interfere unduly with future creation nor cause unjustified harm to 
legitimate public interests such as cultural participation may enjoy copyright protection.” 
Geiger, supra note 260, at 101. Applying this test, most primary instructional materials 
would hardly qualify for any (or extensive) copyright protection. 




creating an international enabling environment conducive to the universal 
fulfillment of the right of access to textbooks, states should also, 
separately and jointly, take all such other deliberate, concrete, and 
targeted steps, they deem appropriate, as would contribute to creating 
such an environment. 
20. Facilitate: Daniel Gervais has recently argued in favor of a 
“middle way” in international IP law, a way that “make[s] the system 
work for all stakeholders, taking due account of the fact that each country 
or region needs some room to calibrate their intellectual property regime 
to their own situation.”336 To a large extent, the above discussion has 
made suggestions in line with the proposal for a middle way. It is not clear 
at all, however, whether the current copyright system can be made to work 
for all in the end. The legitimacy crisis of copyright runs deep. 
Although the encouragement of learning, advancement of knowledge, 
and public education were supposed goals of copyright when this 
originated in the 18th century,337 Lockean conceptions holding that the 
exertion of labor leads to the acquisition of property have since cemented 
the view that copyright and other IP rights constitute property.338 In many 
ways, copyright has come to function like ownership of property. Like the 
latter, copyright reflects a significant power relationship between persons. 
It is not only a government-granted monopoly, but also gives rise to far-
reaching power over others—the power to exclude others from access.339 
In the 20th century, IP rights have become mere investment-protecting 
devices, with little social benefit.340 IHRL is of more recent pedigree than 
international IP law. IHRL protects human rights holistically. Apart from 
civil and political rights, it also encompasses economic, social, cultural, 
and group or solidarity rights. International IP law, also because of its 
earlier origin, has developed largely in isolation from especially the latter 
two groups of rights. Initially, it was considered that civil rights, such as 
freedom of expression, were inherently protected by the structures of 
copyright law. For a long time, therefore, courts were very reluctant to 
test the rules of copyright law against such rights to the extent that any 
defense did not have its foundation in copyright law itself.341 Recently, 
 
336 Daniel J. Gervais, Is There a “Middle Way” in International Intellectual Property?, 
47 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 135, 136–37 (2016). 
337 See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 316 (referring to some historical documents 
in support of this). 
338 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 2d treat., ch. V, ¶ 27 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003). 
339 See, e.g., Story, supra note 15, at 127 (“Copyright . . . represents not only the state’s 
grant of sovereignty to a private party but also power over other people.”) (emphasis 
added). 
340 See Christophe Geiger, Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human 
Rights Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra 
note 232, at 661, 662 (referring to “investment-protection mechanisms” often without 
“social value”). 
341 See Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual Property before the 
European Court of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 43–
44 n.143 (Christophe Geiger, Craig A. Nard & Xavier Seuba eds., 2018) (citing case law 
demonstrating this). 
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however, courts have shown an enhanced willingness to assess the rules 
of copyright law against freedom of expression more generally.342 A 
wholesale subjection of the IP, including the copyright system—and its 
proprietary premise that justifies exclusion—to a review in light of 
economic, social, cultural, and group or solidarity rights by legislators and 
courts, however, has so far not taken place. An assessment in light of these 
rights, with their emphasis on access—facilitating health care, food 
security, education, cultural participation, socio-economic development, 
and so on—could potentially require questioning copyright, or any other 
domain of IP law, as an institution, and its replacement by an alternative 
system, altogether.343 It should be appreciated that a system that respects 
the moral and material interests of creators, but simultaneously facilitates 
access, can look very different from current copyright law.344 
Copyright is premised on the notion that a reward will stimulate the 
creation of culture. As yet, empirical evidence to support this view is 
scant.345 It seems that most works of culture (beyond consumerist 
mainstream culture) are created because of the creative impulse authors 
feel to produce a work.346 Copyright is premised on the notion that authors 
deserve to be rewarded. These days, however, most authors do not benefit 
from copyright. Profits essentially accrue to “large, impersonal and 
unlovable corporations,”347 benefiting shareholders and a handful of 
“stars,” whose art (if it is that) lends itself to lucrative marketing and quick 
consumption. It has even been stated that the power that has become 
concentrated in a few market-dominating firms in conjunction with 
copyright enables those firms to control public communication to the 
detriment of democracy—democracy being based on the freedom to 
communicate and participate in cultural life.348 Copyright is premised on 
the notion that it will lead to a genuine flourishing of culture. In practice, 
linking copyright to the international trade system has served to 
commodify copyrighted works, making them commercial products rather 
than respected pieces of cultural expression, thus spurning global cultural 
 
342 See, e.g., the more recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights: Ashby 
Donald v. France, App. No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 10, 2013); Neij & Sunde 
Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (dec.), App. No. 40397/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 19, 2013). 
343 Perhaps contemplating this, see, e.g., Okediji, supra note 52, at 37 (“[T]he vision of 
human dignity reflected in . . . economic, social, and cultural rights . . . require[s] a 
change in the core rules and assumptions that pervade the IP system.”). 
344 See, e.g., THE COPY/SOUTH RESEARCH GROUP, THE COPY/SOUTH DOSSIER: ISSUES IN 
THE ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY OF COPYRIGHT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 53 
(Alan Story, Colin Darch & Debora Halbert eds., 2006) (“[C]opyright represents one 
possible answer.”). 
345 See, e.g., Sprigman, supra note 28, at 32 (“[T]hese scattered bits of empirical 
evidence suggest that the relationship between copyright and creativity is . . . 
complicated.”). 
346 See, e.g., THE COPY/SOUTH RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 344, at 55 (noting that 
“many of the greatest works of literature and art were—and are being—created without 
any reference to copyright incentives”). 
347 Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
61, 62 (2002). 
348 JOOST SMIERS & MARIEKE VAN SCHIJNDEL, IMAGINE THERE IS NO COPYRIGHT AND 
NO CULTURAL CONGLOMERATES TOO . . . BETTER FOR ARTISTS, DIVERSITY AND THE 
ECONOMY 5 (trans. Rosalind Buck, 2009). 




consumerism.349 Additionally, copyright is premised on the notion that 
individuals’ rights should be protected.350 Copyright is awarded to 
individual authors with respect to types of work considered worthy of 
protection by the global North. Copyright fails to accord protection to 
songs, dances, rituals, objects, and stories produced, over time, by 
communities in the global South.351 Yet, the North has not been reticent 
to use such cultural expression on a large scale for free to generate profit 
not benefitting those communities. In this regard, it has legitimately been 
asked whether it is fair that “developing countries provide a very real right 
to protection for foreign works . . . in their countries in return for the 
largely theoretical right of receiving that treatment in developed 
countries.”352 Globally, copyright royalties and licensing fees flow 
essentially from the South to the North.353 On a more fundamental level, 
copyright may even be too alien a construct for countries of the South. 
Rosemary Coombe notes: 
The range of Western beliefs that define intellectual and cultural 
property laws . . . are not universal values that express the full 
range of human possibility, but particular, interested fictions 
emergent from a history of colonialism that has disempowered 
many of the world’s peoples.354 
 
For which reason Ruth Okediji warns, 
[d]eveloped countries underestimate the degree to which local 
institutions, traditional ideas, and social values will resist a 
wholesale acceptance and application of the philosophy of 
intellectual property rights, and consequently, the TRIPs 
Agreement.355 
 
In light of these observations, it remains to be seen whether the 
suggestions made in this Article are sufficient to secure access rights. As 
the ETOs set out in Points 1 to 19 are complied with, states should, over 
time, monitor progress toward achievement of the access goals. Failing 
sufficient progress, a global obligation necessitating that states should 
undertake more drastic reforms is triggered. In this instance, states should 
reassess international copyright law and its embedment in the related 
world trade system in principle. As radical as it may sound, if necessary, 
they should do away with the current system altogether and substitute it 
 
349 See, e.g., The Copy/South Research Group, supra note 344, at 54–55 (on copyright 
and commodification), at 56 (on copyright and consumerism). 
350 Id. at 53–54 (on copyright and “individualism”). 
351 Id. at 56–61 (on the differing traditions of cultural creation in the South). 
352 Simon Butt, Intellectual Property in Indonesia: A Problematic Legal Transplant, 24 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 429, 431 (2002). 
353 See World Mapper, Map No. 99, Royalties and License Fee Exports, University of 
Sheffield, http://archive.worldmapper.org/posters/worldmapper_map99_ver5.pdf 
(depicting such revenue flows). 
354 ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: 
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 247 (1998). 
355 Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 774 (1996). 
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with an alternative system. Also these are ETOs arising under the right to 
education, the right to development, and other international human rights. 
VIII.   ETOS AS CONSTITUTIONALIZATION “FROM BELOW” IN IP LAW 
It is sometimes said that much of what could be achieved by human 
rights in IP law will be neutralized by the fact that IP rights themselves 
have been promoted to the rank of human rights. This has thus recently 
been lamented passionately by Ruth Okediji.356 In this writer’s view, this 
fear seems exaggerated. Most IP rights are held by companies, that is, 
juristic persons. The CESCR, in its General Comment No. 17, in which it 
analyses the right of everyone “[t]o benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author,” as laid down in 
Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR,357 makes it clear that this right can be 
held by natural persons or groups of natural persons as creators only.358 
The IP claims of natural persons or groups of natural persons attain human 
rights status to the extent that they relate to works that can be considered 
expressions of creative urges and skills intimately bound up with the 
human dignity and personality of the creator or creators. Juristic 
persons—and this includes all publishing companies—are neither natural 
persons nor “creators” in this sense. Regarding the latter point, their IP 
claims are either only acquired from natural persons (the companies being 
mere “holders” of copyright), alternatively, if their IP claims flow from 
works that are self-generated, these claims are not (as they cannot be) 
rooted in human dignity. The rights of juristic persons are, therefore, not 
protected under Article 15(1)(c). The Committee draws express attention 
to this truth.359 In addition, authors’ rights as human rights are subject to 
an important definitional limitation that clearly distinguishes them from 
typical IP rights: They only give rise to a claim to such protection of 
material interests as is necessary to enjoy an adequate standard of 
living.360 This implies a fairly modest level of remuneration. As for all 
human rights, human dignity is the point of reference. Respecting human 
dignity never requires—in fact, often will demand countering—material 
 
356 Okediji, supra note 52. 
357 ICESCR, supra note 115, Art. 15(1)(c). This provision gives legally binding form to 
the largely identically worded predecessor provision of Article 27(2) of the (non-
binding) Universal Declaration of Human Rights. U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 27(2) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
358 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], General Comment No. 17, 
The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests 
Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the 
Author (Art. 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) 
(“only the ‘author,’ namely the creator, whether man or woman, . . . can be the 
beneficiary of the protection of article 15, paragraph 1(c). . . . [A]uthors . . . [are] natural 
persons, . . . [or] . . . groups of individuals.”). 
359 Id. ¶ 7 (“[L]egal entities are included among the holders of intellectual property rights. 
However, . . . their entitlements, because of their different nature, are not protected at the 
level of human rights.”). 
360 Id. ¶ 15 (“[T]he material interests of authors . . . contribute to the enjoyment of the 
right to an adequate standard of living . . . [as protected in] . . . art. 11, para. 1 . . . [of the 
ICESCR].”). 




extravagance. Alternatively, is it not possible to rely on the right to 
property in support of strong IP protection? The right to property, while 
not found in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants,361 is protected in the 
various regional human rights treaties.362 Under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, claims based on the right to property may even be 
raised by juristic persons.363 Yet, two things should constantly be kept in 
mind in this context: first, property in human rights law is always a 
socially constricted concept. Second, the “fundamental” rights of a 
company can never be “human” rights, and can, therefore, not rank on a 
par with actual human rights, such as the right to education. However, 
these are issues that should be discussed in more detail at a future point. 
This said, it should be noted that the right to education may be 
subjected to limitations, also those resulting from copyright law. 
However, for this to succeed, the strict requirements of a limitation clause, 
such as Article 4 of the ICESCR, need to be complied with. Of the latter, 
the CESCR emphasizes that it “is primarily intended to be protective of 
the rights of individuals rather than permissive of the imposition of 
limitations by the State.”364 In terms of Article 4, limitations must be 
“determined by law,” “compatible with the nature of . . . rights,” and 
“solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society.”365 What is of significance here is that non-discriminatory access 
to education is part of the core, the nature of the right to education.366 
Therefore, when any copyright law has the effect of denying access to 
textbooks to disadvantaged students, the limitation will likely not be 
compatible with the nature of the right to education, and thus fail under 
Article 4. 
Ignoring to add the missing dimension of ETOs under IHRL in a 
globalized world will render human rights largely impotent. As has been 
stated correctly, “[h]uman rights have been locked up behind domestic 
bars to prevent their universal application to globalization and its much 
needed regulation. Extraterritorial obligations . . . unlock human 
rights.”367 Thus unlocked, human rights can also “civilize,” or 
“constitutionalize,” IP law. 
The fragmentation of international law is often portrayed as a 
dangerous, aggravating phenomenon. Some may therefore argue in favor 
 
361 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); ICESCR, supra note 115. The right to property 
is, however, protected by Article 17 of the (non-binding) Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. UDHR, supra note 357, Art. 17. 
362 See Protocol to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (entered into force 
May 18, 1954) [hereinafter Protocol No. 1]; American Convention on Human Rights, 
Art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 
1978); African (Banjul) Charter, supra note 139, Art. 14. 
363 See Protocol No. 1, supra note 362, Art. 1(1) (“Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”) (emphasis added). 
364 General Comment No. 13, supra note 124, ¶ 42. 
365 ICESCR, supra note 115, Art. 4. 
366 BEITER, supra note 111, at 458. 
367 ETO CONSORTIUM, https://www.etoconsortium.org (last visited on May 15, 2020). 
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of an international court, such as the International Court of Justice, or a 
new “World Court of Human Rights,”368 exercising global constitutional 
or human rights jurisdiction, and enforcing a set of norms conferred 
express priority over all other law. This is classic constitutionalism, and 
entails “constitutionalization” “from above.” At the other end, some may 
argue in favor of the puristically unstratified nature of international law, 
justifying, for instance, the WTO system as a self-contained regime 
functioning solely according to its own rules. The latter view is hardly 
justifiable anymore today. The former, if (ever) realizable, is 
Zukunftsmusik—a dream of the future. For now, there is a via media. This 
is based on the ETOs concept. 
There are ETOs arising in circumstances where there exists some 
more concrete jurisdictional link between different states. However, the 
emphasis in this Article has been on ETOs of a global character. These 
require states, separately, and jointly through international co-operation, 
to facilitate the realization of human rights universally by creating an 
international enabling environment toward this end—and, sometimes, to 
contribute to realization through concrete assistance. These ETOs have 
their basis in, for example, the U.N. Charter or the ICESCR.369 Clearly: if 
we say that states, when acting on the international plane—alone or 
together with other states, for instance in international organizations—are 
required by ETOs under IHRL to create, interpret, and apply IP, trade, 
and all other international law in consonance with their human rights 
obligations, this could have a “constitutionalizing” effect on the law. The 
same “constitutionalizing” effect would flow from the interpretation of 
the law, in this way, by the different international fora—all ultimately 
established and entrusted with interpretative competences by states. Here 
one is dealing with a more subtle, mediated, or “evolving” form of 
constitutionalization. It is perhaps a form of constitutionalization “from 
below”—by states through their regular conduct, or through the 
jurisprudence of courts or tribunals. 
However, what if subsequent to the creation of IP, trade, or any other 
international law, its compatibility with human rights obligations is in 
doubt? The endeavor of interpretation or application in accordance with 
human rights may raise difficult questions. In 2001, the CESCR 
emphasized that “national and international intellectual property regimes 
must be consistent with the obligation of States parties to ensure the 
progressive realization of full enjoyment of all the rights in the 
Covenant.”370 In the same year, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, as it then was, “[r]emind[ed] 
all Governments of the primacy of human rights obligations under 
 
368 See notably Manfred Nowak, The Need for a World Court of Human Rights, 7 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 251 (2007). 
369 See supra Section VI, where this has been discussed. 
370 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. [CESCR], Statement on Human Rights 
and Intellectual Property, Follow-up to the Day of General Discussion on Art. 15(1)(c), 
¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001). 




international law over economic policies and agreements.”371 The 
question, of course, is, what is the consequence of international IP law not 
complying with IHRL? Will human rights prevail? It is important to 
appreciate the reality of hierarchies of various sorts in international law,372 
which are enforced in a decentralized fashion. Hence, a treaty may not 
conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law (ius 
cogens).373 There are obligations erga omnes; obligations of such 
importance that they are owed to a group of states or the international 
community as a whole.374 Article 103 of the U.N. Charter provides that, 
in the event of a conflict between the obligations of U.N. members under 
the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the Charter will prevail.375 Human rights are 
associated with each of these hierarchies.376 This is clearly true for ius 
cogens.377 Regarding obligations erga omnes, it has been stated that “it 
 
371 Sub-Comm’n H.R. Res. 2001/21, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, ¶ 3 
(Aug. 16, 2001). 
372 In this sense, see also Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report 
of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, ¶ 407, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (explaining that, depending on the precise context, there 
exist “relations of superiority and inferiority” between norms of international law). 
373 VCLT, supra note 264, Art. 53. Such a treaty is void. Id. The International Law 
Commission has been considering the topic of ius cogens since 2015. In his third report 
of 2018 to the Commission, which addresses the consequences and legal effects of ius 
cogens norms, the Special Rapporteur to the Commission, Dire Tladi, includes among 
his proposals for draft conclusions that also customary international law, unilateral acts, 
and binding resolutions of international organizations in conflict with ius cogens should 
be held to be invalid. Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on Peremptory 
Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), ¶ 160, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/714 
(Feb. 12, 2018) (Draft Conclusions 15–17). 
374 See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5) (introducing this concept into positive law). 
375 U.N. Charter Art. 103. 
376 On hierarchies in international law, and their frequent association with human rights, 
see Beiter, Conformity between TRIPS and Human Rights, supra note 26, at 470–75, and 
all the sources cited there. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 372, Part E of the report. 
377 Does ius cogens have any relevance in the field of international copyright law? This 
is conceivable. To mention an example: The prohibition of genocide is usually 
considered to constitute ius cogens. See Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report 
on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), ¶ 137, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/727 (Jan. 31, 2019) (Draft Conclusion 24). (The other clear instances of ius 
cogens are: the prohibition of aggression, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of 
racial discrimination, the prohibition of crimes against humanity, the prohibition of 
torture, the right to self-determination, and the basic rules of international humanitarian 
law. Id.) Without wishing to fully argue the case here, it may be noted that one of the 
most renowned scholars on the topic of linguistic human rights in education, Tove 
Skuttnab-Kangas, has made an interesting argument to the effect that the assimilationist 
language policies in the sphere of education pursued by many states, realistically 
adjudged, amount to intentionally applying various forms of psychological pressure to 
ensure children “will transfer” to the dominant language of a society. This, she argues, 
does actually fall within the definition of genocide as set out in the U.N. Genocide 
Convention. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Arts. II, III, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (definition 
of genocide and punishable acts). She points out that, although the Convention does not 
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seems best to consider human rights obligations generally as a class of 
erga omnes obligations.”378 On this premise, also the right to education 
gives rise to obligations erga omnes. As for the U.N. Charter, this 
provides for respect for human rights as a U.N. goal.379 “Respect for 
human rights” could be held to include a reference to the right to 
education.380 
Moreover, lex specialis derogat legi generali. International IP, 
specifically WTO law (lex specialis), which provides the operational 
effectiveness promoting the objectives of international IP/WTO law that 
“general” international law (lex generalis) lacks, prevails over the latter. 
However, as Bruno Simma underlines: “‘Self-contained regimes’ cannot, 
at least not completely, “contract out” of, decouple themselves, from, the 
 
explicitly cover cultural genocide, the deliberation of the issue when drafting the 
Convention has left “a definition of linguistic genocide, which most states then in the 
UN were prepared to accept.” See TOVE SKUTNABB-KANGAS, LINGUISTIC GENOCIDE IN 
EDUCATION—OR WORLDWIDE DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS? xxxi–xxxiii, 202, 314, 
316–17, 327, 369, 652 (2000) (discussing the aspect of psychological force as equivalent 
to physical force, (bogus) consent to linguistic assimilation, the Genocide Convention 
and its drafting history, the difference between (“good”) motive and (punishable) 
criminal intent, active “killing” and (equally reprehensible) passive “letting die,” and 
weak and non-forms of bilingual education as amounting to genocide by “forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group” within the definition of Article II(e) 
of the Genocide Convention). At this point then, it may well be asked whether 
international copyright is not complicit in achieving such linguistic genocide in relation 
to many endangered and vulnerable languages and their speakers. Under the 
Berne/TRIPS system, the translation of literary and artistic works is the exclusive right 
of the copyright holder (see supra Section I). The stated system does not provide for 
special L&Es for translation (see supra Section III) and the Berne Appendix, including 
its translation mechanism, is dysfunctional, maybe even purposefully (see supra 
Section IV). Consequently, translation into the languages of those that otherwise do not 
have such access to educational materials in their own language as would be necessary 
to ensuring their survival as a cultural group has been rendered impossible. On this 
account, one might have to argue that Article 8 of the Berne Convention, protecting the 
copyright holder’s exclusive translation right—at any rate, in its generality—is void as 
being in conflict with ius cogens. Berne Convention, supra note 19, Art. 8. 
378 IAN D. SEIDERMAN, HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
DIMENSION 145 (2001). 
379 U.N. Charter Art. 1(3) (“[t]o achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”), linked to obligations in Arts. 55(c), 56 
(stating that the U.N. “shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion,” and laying down the “pledge” of U.N. members “to take joint and separate 
action in cooperation with the Organization” for the achievement of that goal, 
respectively). 
380 Specifically with regard to Article 56, it has been noted that “the obligation is far from 
precise . . . But does this mean that it cannot be considered a legal obligation? In view 
of both the history and the language of this Article, this would certainly be an extreme 
conclusion.” Oscar Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights 
Provisions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 650–51 (1951). Furthermore, ever 
since, the U.N.’s normative activities of formulating declarations and conventions in the 
field of human rights have given concrete content to the term “human rights” in the 
Charter. 




system of general international law.”381 Self-contained regimes continue 
to draw their legitimacy from general international law.382 It has been 
observed that “the spirit of human rights” has meanwhile entered the area 
of general international law.383 Many rules of lex generalis embody 
“internationally recognized ethical positions.”384 Today, many human 
rights form part of general international law. It has thus been held with 
regard to economic, social, and cultural rights that “at least some 
elements” of the rights to work, just and favorable conditions of 
employment, a decent standard of living, freedom from hunger, health, 
and education constitute (general) customary law.385 Various human 
rights, including some of those that would not qualify as custom for lack 
of state practice, would further have to be considered “general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations” in the sense of Article 38(1)(c) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.386 Certain norms of 
general international law are not dispositive in nature. Self-contained 
regimes cannot “contract out” of lex generalis “if obligations of general 
law are of ‘integral’ or ‘interdependent’ nature, have erga omnes 
character or practice has created a legitimate expectation of non-
derogation.”387 Apart from their status as rules of special human rights 
regimes, certain human rights would therefore—as they possess (for 
instance) erga omnes character—qualify as strict (“non-dispositive”) 
rules of general international law as well. International IP regimes cannot 
exclude the applicability of these human rights of lex generalis. Core 
aspects of the right to education, such as free primary education, covering 
also extraterritorial dimensions of that right, might be included in this 
rubric of norms. 
Whenever the provision of a self-contained regime needs to be 
interpreted—and this is of special significance where that provision 
potentially conflicts with an “outside rule”—international law envisages 
that interpretation should take place in accordance with the principle of 
“systemic integration,” as laid down in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.388 Article 31(3)(c) codifies (general) 
customary international law and, as such, applies with regard to the 
international IP treaties. Essentially, there must be an attempt at a 
 
381 Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a 
Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265, 275 (2009). 
382 See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained 
Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483, 510 (2006) (“In strong regimes 
[such as WTO law], general international law . . . serve[s] as a source of legitimacy.”). 
383 Id. at 524. 
384 Id. at 511. 
385 ADAM MCBETH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 40–41 
(2010). 
386 The understanding of “general principles” here is that of consensual rules arising and 
recognized at the international level through their “direct and spontaneous” “expression 
in legal form.” Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. YBIL 82, 105 (1988–1989). 
387 Koskenniemi, supra note 372, ¶ 154. 
388 Treaty terms must be interpreted in their context. VCLT, supra note 264, Art. 31(1). 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context . . . any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” Id. Art. 31(3)(c). 
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harmonious reading, which seeks to understand the provision concerned 
in light of all other applicable (including potentially conflicting) norms of 
general international law and those of other self-contained regimes.389 
While the consequences of non-compliance with ius cogens are clear, the 
position relating to other “superior” or “systemically crucial” norms could 
be held to be that, in the process of interpretation, these obligations need 
to be given weight in a way that takes account of their normative force.390 
Yet, as Joost Pauwelyn points out with regard to interpretation in 
terms of Article 31(3)(c), external norms can only assist in giving 
meaning to terms used in a treaty, but cannot overrule them.391 The treaty 
being interpreted retains a primary role, the external norm has a secondary 
role—the latter cannot displace the treaty norm, wholly or partly.392 
Hence, where the “outside rule” is a human rights obligation, the 
danger—as renowned scholars of international law note—is that 
“systemic integration” might compel a compromise in which the human 
rights norm essentially disappears.393 However, perhaps this is where 
ETOs to interpret (and apply) international law in consonance with human 
rights might prove useful. In a harmonious reading of conflicting norms, 
they could help keep alive the realization that the rules of any self-
contained regime were supposed to have been created in conformity with 
human rights (as “superior” or “systemically crucial” legal norms). This 
might help ensure that the contours of human rights always remain clearly 
visible in any interpretation of the law. Better yet, of course, would be a 
modification of the rules of treaty interpretation within the context of self-
contained regimes such as WTO law so that human rights can be taken 
into account more effectively. This is possible as the current rules of 
interpretation constitute ordinary customary law that lex specialis may 
qualify. 
However, what if, after having had recourse to the instruments of 
interpretation that international law places at the interpreter’s disposal, an 
interpretation in accordance with human rights can, after all, not be 
achieved in any particular situation? ETOs to “create, interpret, and 
apply” IP, trade, and all other international law in consonance with human 
rights remain applicable in this case. Conceptually, ETOs claim priority—
that they “exist first.” Their claim is that all subsequent norms of 
international law should obey and promote human rights universally. 
Consequently, they will expect problematic rules of a self-contained 
regime to be amended. As many ETOs will have to be seen as reflecting 
 
389 Generally on “systemic integration,” see Koskenniemi, supra note 372, Part F of the 
report; JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW 
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 253–72 (2003). 
390 See Koskenniemi, supra note 372, ¶¶ 473–74 (referring to “the weight” of the 
obligations). 
391 PAUWELYN, supra note 389, at 254. 
392 Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law, 1 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 102–103 (1998). 
393 See Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar, Conclusions, in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 300, 309 (Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012) 
(Systemic integration “can also result in a reduction of the scope of human rights 
obligations to the point where they merely exist in name.”). 




“superior” or “systemically crucial” legal norms, this claim should usually 
prevail. 
The ETOs concept, meanwhile, enjoys considerable support among 
scholars and among members of the U.N. human rights treaty bodies. This 
Article focused on ETOs under the right to education that could harness 
copyright and promote access to printed textbooks in schools and 
universities in developing countries, notably in Africa. The analysis 
should be deepened and extended to include other fields of IP law in 
potential conflict with IHRL as well. Future analyses should give 
consideration to issues that could not be addressed here. The 
consequences for the debate of recognizing a potential basis of some IP 
claims themselves in human rights law must be examined, and so must be 
those flowing from the fact that human rights may (sometimes) be 
subjected to restrictions in terms of limitation clauses. ETOs for each 
human right need to be defined with precision. It must be explained when 
non-compliance amounts to a prima facie violation of human rights. 
Grounds of justification need to be elucidated. Issues of jurisdiction, 
remedies, relief, and fora of enforcement require further clarification. 
The author of this Article was recently asked to peer review an article 
for a legal journal. It was clear that its writer, who was doing postgraduate 
research at a university in an African country, was talented. However, the 
sources (s)he cited did not go beyond the 1970s. It seems his or her 
university’s library was financially unable to acquire subsequently 
published books and journals. This author had then attempted to provide 
some of the more recent relevant literature to the writer, but could also 
not legally retrieve this in South Africa, where he is based. The literature 
can, however, be downloaded (from anywhere in the world) on Sci-Hub, 
the infamous illegal, but education and research-saving pirate database for 
academic literature founded by Alexandra Elbakyan.394 Students at this 
author’s university, many of whom are not able to afford their prescribed 
textbooks, actually copy whole textbooks or download them on Sci-Hub. 
The question that may be posed is: Who is perverse—the African 
copyright pirate or the situation in which he or she lives?395 The situation 
referred to is one of socio-economic hardship and exclusion rooted at least 
partially in colonialism. The situation is one in which access to textbooks, 
and knowledge generally, often does not exist at all, or can only be 
obtained by breaking the law. The situation is further one of African 
countries, and of developing countries in general, being exposed and 
succumbing to the trade pressures of affluent countries, the former 
 
394 George Monbiot, Scientific Publishing Is a Rip-Off: We Fund the Research—It Should 
be Free, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/13/scientific-publishing-rip-off-
taxpayers-fund-research (“Had I not used the stolen material provided by Sci-Hub, it 
would have cost me thousands. . . . [I]t is possible that [Elbakyan] has saved my life. . . . 
There might be legal justifications for [the practices of the publishing industry]. There 
are no ethical justifications.”). 
395 In its formulation and meaning this question is, by way of analogy, broadly based on 
the aphorismic title of the German film: NICHT DER HOMOSEXUELLE IST PERVERS, 
SONDERN DIE SITUATION, IN DER ER LEBT [Not the Homosexual is Perverse, but the 
Situation in which he Lives] (Werner Klieβ, 1971) (directed by Rosa von Praunheim). 
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consequently enacting strict copyright laws that do not take account of 
local access to knowledge needs. This really is new colonialism.396 Last, 
but not least, the situation is also one of governments in Africa and other 
parts of the developing world reprehensibly failing to take a firmer stand 
than they could to defend their own people’s rights. 
In 2002, Peter Drahos had provided this advice to developing 
countries: 
Given the track record of the United States and the EU, developing 
countries can expect very few concessions on intellectual property 
issues in either a bilateral or multilateral context. They will have 
to look to self-help on these issues and operate on the assumption 
that the global intellectual property ratchet will continue to be 
worked by the United States and the EU in their economic 
interests, with only minimal consideration being given to the 
interests of developing countries.397 
 
Now, almost twenty years later, a form of self-help promises to be 
fruitful—the reliance on ETOs. The ETOs concept has developed to an 
extent where these obligations should become part of the strategy of 
developing countries in asserting their development needs globally more 
forcefully, as a matter of human rights. Developing countries should, 
separately and jointly, rely on ETOs to legally enforce changes in global 
IP, including copyright law that protect access to knowledge and 
textbooks, the right to education, the right to development, and all other 
human rights. 
 
396 Also in this sense, see, e.g., Eve Gray in DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, FAIR USE (ReCreate 
South Africa, 2018), film available at http://infojustice.org/archives/40384 (“The big 
powers realized that knowledge was very, very important, and very strategic. . . . [The 
endeavor] to grab hold of knowledge and control it . . . is a colonial effort.”); Peter 
Drahos, Cities of Planning and Cities of Non-Planning: A Geography of Intellectual 
Property, WORLD INFORMATION SPECIAL CITY EDITION TUNIS 2005 (Institute for New 
Culture Technologies, World-Information Institute, Nov. 14, 2005), http://future-
nonstop.org/c/c794ebdbecc0a9f8d48f2594161f2614 (“Intellectual property laws with 
their epicenter in Washington, New York, Brussels and Geneva travel like invisible 
tsunamis to developing countries. There they turn the national innovation systems of 
those countries into so much debris. New laws to serve old masters have to be quickly 
enacted.”). 
397 Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property 
Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 789 (2002). 
